State v. Presha
2000 N.J. LEXIS 354, 748 A.2d 1108, 163 N.J. 304 (2000)
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Rule of Law:
Courts evaluate the voluntariness of a juvenile's confession under the totality of the circumstances, with the absence of a parent or legal guardian from the interrogation being a highly significant factor; however, for juveniles under the age of fourteen, parental absence renders a confession inadmissible as a matter of law unless the parent is truly unavailable or unwilling to be present.
Facts:
- In the early morning hours of February 27, 1995, the Willingboro home of seventy-year-old John Oldham and his seventy-three-year-old wife, Sarah Oldham, was burglarized by two knife-armed assailants who beat John, cut both Oldhams' throats, and fled with Mrs. Oldham’s purse.
- Police officers followed footprints in the snow from the Oldham residence to the nearby home of P.Z. (the defendant), who was then within two weeks of his seventeenth birthday and had fifteen prior arrests on unrelated charges.
- P.Z.'s mother, Michelle Robinson, answered the door, informed officers P.Z. was the last to enter the house, and agreed to take P.Z. and his brother to the Willingboro Police Station, later transferring them to the Burlington County Prosecutor’s Office.
- At the Prosecutor's Office, Detective Jay Brown advised P.Z. of his Miranda rights with Mrs. Robinson present in the same room, and both P.Z. and Mrs. Robinson signed the Miranda card, indicating understanding.
- After discussing the matter with P.Z., Mrs. Robinson and P.Z. decided that she should leave the room during questioning, after which two detectives interviewed P.Z. for approximately forty to fifty minutes.
- During subsequent interrogation sessions separated by breaks, P.Z. initially denied central involvement, then claimed to be a lookout, and eventually, after being confronted with evidence, admitted committing the offenses with his cousin.
- Sometime before P.Z. provided a taped confession, Mrs. Robinson asked an officer if she could see P.Z. and stated that she thought her sons should have a lawyer, but the officer replied that it was not necessary, and Mrs. Robinson did not see P.Z. until after he completed his taped statement.
Procedural Posture:
- P.Z. was charged with second-degree conspiracy, first-degree robbery, and second-degree burglary in connection with the home invasion.
- The trial court conducted a four-day Miranda hearing to determine the voluntariness and admissibility of P.Z.'s confession.
- The trial court found P.Z.'s confession voluntary based on the totality of circumstances, including his advanced age, prior experience with law enforcement, and his decision to have his mother out of the room during questioning.
- P.Z. pled guilty to the charges pursuant to a plea agreement, reserving his right to appeal the trial court's ruling on the confession's admissibility.
- The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's finding that P.Z.'s confession was voluntary and admissible in an unreported decision, though it did agree with P.Z. that his conspiracy conviction should merge with his robbery or burglary convictions.
- The Supreme Court of New Jersey granted defendant’s petition for certification to review the voluntariness of his confession.
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Issue:
Does the absence of a parent during a custodial interrogation, particularly when the parent was initially present and agreed to leave but later sought to rejoin, render a nearly seventeen-year-old juvenile's confession involuntary and thus inadmissible under the totality of circumstances?
Opinions:
Majority - Verniero, J.
Yes, a juvenile's confession can be voluntary and admissible even if a parent is absent from the interrogation room, provided the totality of circumstances demonstrates a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of rights, particularly when the juvenile is nearly seventeen, familiar with the criminal justice system, and chose for the parent to be absent. The Court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that the "totality of circumstances" test applies to juvenile confessions. While the absence of a parent is a "highly significant factor" to be given added weight in this balance, it is not dispositive, especially when the juvenile is older, experienced with law enforcement, and initially chose to proceed without a parent. The Court noted that P.Z. was almost seventeen, had fifteen prior arrests, and his mother was present for the Miranda warnings and initially agreed to leave the room. The police provided breaks and treated him fairly, indicating his will was not overborne. The Court established a bright-line rule for juveniles under fourteen, stating that parental absence renders a statement inadmissible as a matter of law, unless the parent is truly unavailable or unwilling to be present. For all juveniles, law enforcement must use their best efforts to locate a parent and account for those efforts to the trial court's satisfaction. The court distinguished this case from State v. Reed, which involved the deliberate exclusion of a lawyer, emphasizing the unique role of an attorney versus a parent. The court judged the police by the standards prevailing at the time of the interrogation, noting that deliberate exclusion of a parent in future cases would almost invariably lead to suppression.
Concurring - Stein, J.
Yes, the defendant's confession was admissible, as the parent was present during Miranda warnings and voluntarily left. However, Justice Stein concurred to advocate for a clearer, brighter-line rule: that the deliberate exclusion of a parent from a juvenile's interrogation, where the parent was not present at all, should render any confession inadmissible as a matter of law in future cases. Justice Stein argued that the majority's formulation, while stating it would be "difficult to envision prosecutors successfully carrying their burdens" in such cases, lacked the unequivocal clarity needed for law enforcement. He highlighted that many other states apply such a rule, either by statute or judicial decision, to protect juveniles' rights. He further emphasized the critical connection between a parent's presence and a juvenile's ability to exercise the right to counsel, stating that denying parents access effectively denies the juvenile their right to legal assistance, as most juveniles cannot retain counsel independently. He compared the parent's role to an attorney's in ensuring the juvenile's constitutional rights are protected, citing People v. Burton.
Analysis:
This case significantly shaped the standards for admitting juvenile confessions in New Jersey, establishing a two-tiered approach. For juveniles under 14, it created a near per se rule of inadmissibility without a parent (if available), offering heightened protection. For older juveniles, it reiterated the "totality of circumstances" but elevated the "absence of a parent" to a "highly significant factor," requiring courts to give it substantial weight, which could lead to more suppressions in cases where parental absence is a prominent issue. The explicit distinction from State v. Reed clarifies that parental presence, while important, does not equate to the constitutional right to counsel, thereby avoiding a per se exclusion rule for older juveniles when a parent is excluded but an attorney is not immediately sought or available.
