State v. Pierre
320 So. 2d 185 (1975)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
The crime of simple burglary in Louisiana, as defined by Article 62 of the Criminal Code, does not require entry into a part of a vehicle designed for human habitation, but rather any unauthorized entry with intent to commit a theft "therein."
Facts:
- Hillary Pierre stood in front of a 1974 Ford Maverick belonging to J. C. Combe.
- Pierre raised the hood of J. C. Combe's car.
- Pierre took out a pair of pliers.
- Pierre disengaged the car battery from the vehicle.
- Pierre lifted the battery out of the car.
- Pierre walked off with the car battery.
- Police officers on patrol observed Pierre's actions.
Procedural Posture:
- The District Attorney of Orleans Parish charged Hillary Pierre by bill of information with simple burglary of a 1974 Ford automobile belonging to J. C. Combe, under Article 62 of the Criminal Code.
- Pierre filed a motion to quash the bill of information, arguing that the information failed to charge an offense punishable under a valid statute because the facts established the automobile itself was not 'entered' in a way denounced by any criminal statute.
- The trial judge quashed the bill of information.
- The State of Louisiana applied for certiorari to the Supreme Court of Louisiana, which was granted.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does the unauthorized entry into the engine compartment of a vehicle, by opening its hood, with the intent to steal a battery, constitute "simple burglary" under Louisiana Revised Statutes Article 62, even if that part of the vehicle is not designed for human habitation?
Opinions:
Majority - Summers, Justice
Yes, the unauthorized entry into the engine compartment of a vehicle, by opening its hood, with the intent to steal a battery, constitutes "simple burglary" under Louisiana Revised Statutes Article 62, even if that part of the vehicle is not designed for human habitation. The Court reasoned that in Louisiana, crimes are purely statutory and there are no common-law crimes; thus, the determination and definition of criminal acts are legislative functions. Article 62 defines simple burglary as "the unauthorized entering of any dwelling, vehicle, watercraft, or other structure, movable or immovable, with the intent to commit a felony or any theft therein." Crucially, unlike Article 60 (aggravated burglary) which references "inhabited" dwellings or places "where a person is present," Article 62 makes no such reference. This distinction signifies the legislature's deliberate intent to broaden the definition of simple burglary to include entries into non-habitable enclosures. Therefore, when the language of a criminal statute is clear, courts must apply its plain meaning without resorting to historical or common-law interpretations. Opening the hood and removing the battery was an unauthorized entry into the vehicle with intent to commit a theft therein.
Concurring - Dixon, J.
No reasoning provided in the case text.
Dissenting - Barham, J.
No reasoning provided in the case text.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the scope of simple burglary in Louisiana, particularly concerning vehicles. By rejecting common law interpretations and strictly adhering to the plain language of the statute, the court established that 'entry' for burglary purposes is not limited to areas designed for human habitation. This ruling broadens the protection against theft from vehicles, ensuring that perpetrators who access engine compartments or other non-passenger areas with intent to steal can be charged under simple burglary statutes. It reinforces the principle that Louisiana's criminal code is entirely statutory, limiting judicial discretion to import historical definitions when statutory language is unambiguous.
