State v. Pierce
11 La.App. 5 Cir. 320, 2011 WL 6934221, 80 So. 3d 1267 (2011)
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Rule of Law:
A trial court's denial of a motion for mistrial based on an oblique reference to a defendant's post-arrest silence or an unsolicited reference to other crimes by a witness is not an abuse of discretion if the reference was not deliberately elicited by the prosecutor and did not substantially prejudice the defendant. Moreover, severance of sexual offense charges involving different victims and timelines is discretionary and not required where the offenses are of similar character, the evidence would be admissible as 'other crimes' evidence, and the jury is instructed to consider each count separately. A child witness's competency is determined by their understanding of truth and falsehood, not age, and the trial court has wide discretion in this determination.
Facts:
- In August 2007, J.G., a seven-year-old, lived with her parents in Kenner, Louisiana, and her mother was dating Preston Lee Pierce.
- On August 25, 2007, while babysitting J.G., Preston Lee Pierce took her to his bedroom, applied a lubricant, and sexually contacted her vagina and anus with his penis.
- Following Preston Lee Pierce's arrest for the incident involving J.G. and subsequent news publicity, his adult daughter, C.P., came forward and alleged that he had sexually abused her from age six or seven until she was 15 or 16, including contact with his penis and one instance of full penetration.
- J.T., a friend of Preston Lee Pierce's son, testified that in June 2003, while intoxicated and asleep, she awoke to find Preston Lee Pierce on top of her, penetrating her vagina with his penis.
- M.B. testified that around April-September 1994, when she was three to four years old and sharing an apartment with Preston Lee Pierce, he repeatedly took her to his bedroom and applied Vaseline to her vagina.
Procedural Posture:
- On December 20, 2007, Preston Lee Pierce was indicted with aggravated rape of a juvenile.
- On January 20, 2009, a superseding indictment was filed, charging Preston Lee Pierce with two counts of aggravated rape and two counts of sexual battery for four separate juveniles.
- Preston Lee Pierce pled not guilty to all four charges and proceeded to trial.
- Pre-trial, Preston Lee Pierce moved to sever the offenses, which the trial court denied after a hearing.
- Prior to trial, a hearing was held to determine the competency of J.G. as a witness, and the trial judge found her competent to testify.
- On October 10, 2010, a 12-person jury found Preston Lee Pierce guilty as charged on all four counts.
- The trial court sentenced Preston Lee Pierce to life imprisonment on counts one and two, ten years on count three, and 25 years on count four, all to run consecutively without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
- Preston Lee Pierce appealed his convictions and sentences to the Louisiana Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit.
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Issue:
Does a trial court abuse its discretion by denying a motion for mistrial based on a witness's oblique reference to a defendant's post-arrest silence, a victim's unsolicited reference to the defendant's prior arrest, or the failure to sever multiple sexual offense charges involving different victims, and by finding a child victim competent to testify?
Opinions:
Majority - Marc E. Johnson
No, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motions for mistrial or in finding the child victim competent to testify. Regarding the reference to Preston Lee Pierce's post-arrest silence, the court found the police officer's testimony that Pierce did not give another statement was an oblique reference made to establish a timeline of the investigation, not an attempt to exploit his silence or impeach his testimony, consistent with State v. Olivieri and State v. Kersey. For the reference to other crimes evidence, the court determined that C.P.'s unsolicited remark about her father being arrested in the past was not deliberately elicited by the prosecutor and was unresponsive to the question, thus not warranting a mandatory mistrial under La.C.Cr.P. art. 770 or 771. On the issue of severance, the court concluded that the trial court properly denied the motion because the offenses, though involving different victims and timelines, were of similar character, the evidence of each offense would have been admissible as 'other crimes' evidence under La. C.E. art. 412.2 to show propensity in sex offense cases involving minors, the investigation was intertwined, and the jury was clearly instructed and able to segregate the various counts, following precedents like State v. Roca and State v. Burks. The prosecutor's closing remark, when viewed in context with clear instructions to the jury to consider each count separately, was not deemed prejudicial. Finally, the court affirmed J.G.'s competency to testify, citing La. C.E. art. 601, as she demonstrated an understanding of the difference between truth and falsehood, knew the importance of the oath, and was aware of potential punishment for lying, despite her age and mental health diagnoses, aligning with State v. Cedrington and State v. Gaal.
Analysis:
This case significantly reinforces the broad discretion afforded to trial courts in managing criminal proceedings, particularly concerning motions for mistrial and the consolidation of charges. It clarifies that not every ambiguous reference to a defendant's post-arrest silence or prior bad acts will necessitate a mistrial, especially when not intentionally elicited by the prosecution. Crucially, the decision highlights the strong precedential value of La. C.E. art. 412.2, which allows for propensity evidence in multi-victim sexual offense cases involving minors, provided the jury is properly instructed. This ruling provides essential guidance for prosecutors and defense attorneys navigating evidentiary challenges and the admission of child victim testimony in sex crime cases, solidifying the framework for ensuring fair, yet efficient, trials.
