State v. Phillips
194 W. Va. 569, 461 S.E.2d 75 (1995)
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Rule of Law:
The admissibility of present sense impressions under Rule 803(1) and statements of then-existing mental, emotional, or physical condition under Rule 803(3) requires strict adherence to contemporaneity, descriptive relevance to an event, and exclusion of statements of memory or belief. Furthermore, West Virginia statutory law mandates a jury panel 'free from exception,' making a trial court's erroneous refusal to strike a biased juror for cause reversible error, even if the defendant uses a peremptory challenge.
Facts:
- Craig G. Phillips and Cynthia Phillips were married and resided in Barbour County.
- On the morning of April 29, 1991, Craig G. Phillips shot Cynthia Phillips in their home, resulting in her fatal injury.
- Craig G. Phillips claimed he returned home from turkey hunting that morning because his gun jammed, and he brought it into the living room to ascertain the cause.
- While attempting to eject shotgun shells and simultaneously talking on the telephone, Craig G. Phillips claimed he became entangled in the telephone cord, causing the shotgun to accidentally discharge and fatally injure Cynthia Phillips, who was resting on the sofa.
- The State, in contrast, asserted that Cynthia Phillips was standing next to the sofa when shot and that Craig G. Phillips moved her body to the sofa after she collapsed.
- The State's theory posited that the couple experienced significant marital problems, primarily due to Craig G. Phillips's extramarital affairs.
- The State contended that Cynthia Phillips had recently discovered Craig G. Phillips's most recent affair, confronted him, and intended to divorce him and seek half of their substantial marital assets.
Procedural Posture:
- An original investigation by local police into Cynthia Phillips's death concluded the incident was an accident.
- A separate investigation by the prosecutor and State police, prompted by inconsistent statements about the shooting, led to Craig G. Phillips's indictment for murder.
- A jury in the Circuit Court of Barbour County returned a verdict of second-degree murder against Craig G. Phillips.
- Craig G. Phillips (defendant/appellant) appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, assigning several errors.
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Issue:
1. Did the trial court commit reversible error by admitting the victim's out-of-court statements as hearsay under the present sense impression or state-of-mind exceptions of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence? 2. Does a trial court's erroneous refusal to strike a biased juror for cause constitute reversible error, even when the defendant subsequently uses a peremptory challenge to remove that juror?
Opinions:
Majority - Cleckley, Justice
Yes, the trial court committed reversible error by improperly admitting hearsay statements from the victim under Rules 803(1) and 803(3) of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence, and separately, the defendant was wrongfully deprived of his statutory right to a jury panel free from exception. The court first addressed the hearsay issue, stating that the victim's out-of-court statements, offered by prosecution witnesses (Dora Clark, Vonda Abbott, Patty Isner Marsh, Mary Phillips) concerning Craig Phillips's extramarital affairs and Cynthia Phillips's intent to divorce and seek marital assets, were improperly admitted. These statements did not qualify as "present sense impressions" under Rule 803(1) because they were not made at the time of or immediately after an event, nor did they describe an event. Instead, they were narrative statements of past information and future plans, lacking the required contemporaneity and reflexivity. The court emphasized that a statement must describe or explain an event, not merely relate to it or be evoked by it. The statements also failed to qualify under the "then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition" exception under Rule 803(3). While the victim's state of mind could be relevant, here it was deemed "remotely related" to the core issue of accidental shooting. Critically, statements of "memory or belief" (e.g., about past affairs) are specifically excluded from Rule 803(3) and the trial court failed to "dissect" the narrative statements into admissible single declarations versus inadmissible statements of memory, as required by Williamson v. United States. The court further criticized the trial court for failing to perform the necessary balancing under Rule 403, which dictates exclusion if probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. Given the pervasive nature of this erroneously admitted evidence, the court concluded it was not harmless error, as the State heavily relied on it to establish motive. Second, concerning jury selection, the court clarified that while the loss of a peremptory challenge due to a trial court's erroneous refusal to strike a juror for cause does not violate a defendant's constitutional right to an impartial jury if the seated jury is impartial (Ross v. Oklahoma), West Virginia's statutory law (W.Va. Code, 62-3-3) provides a stronger protection. This statute grants a defendant the specific right to a panel of twenty jurors "free from exception" before exercising peremptory challenges. Therefore, the court reaffirmed its precedent that denying a valid challenge for cause is reversible error, even if the defendant later uses a peremptory challenge to remove the biased juror. While not definitively ruling on whether the trial court abused its discretion in this specific case (due to reversal on other grounds), the court noted that two jurors expressed significant doubts about their impartiality regarding adultery evidence, which would have justified their removal for cause.
Dissenting - Workman, Justice
No, the trial court did not commit reversible error because the victim's out-of-court statements were admissible as non-hearsay evidence to establish the defendant's motive, or alternatively, were admissible under the Rule 803(3) state-of-mind exception, and in any event, any error in their admission was harmless given the overwhelming circumstantial evidence. Justice Workman argued that the majority's lengthy discussion of hearsay exceptions missed the fundamental point that the victim's statements were not hearsay at all. Under West Virginia Rule of Evidence 801(c) and State v. Maynard, statements are not hearsay if offered for a purpose other than proving the truth of the matter asserted. Here, the statements about Craig Phillips's affairs and Cynthia Phillips's intent to divorce were not offered to prove that Craig Phillips actually committed adultery or that Cynthia Phillips actually would have divorced him, but rather to show Cynthia Phillips's state of mind and belief, which in turn circumstantially proved Craig Phillips's possible motive for murder. This falls within a well-established non-hearsay use. The dissent argued that failing to recognize this non-hearsay purpose creates confusion for lower courts. The dissent also contended that even if considered Rule 404(b) evidence (uncharged misconduct), the extensive in camera hearings conducted by the trial court satisfied the State v. McGinnis requirements for admissibility, and direct evidence of Craig Phillips's infidelity was presented by another witness, minimizing any prejudice from the hearsay statements. Furthermore, Justice Workman asserted that even if the statements were hearsay, they were properly admissible under Rule 803(3) because the victim's state of mind (fear, intent to end the marriage) was highly relevant to the defendant's motive, especially in light of the accidental shooting defense. This view is supported by cases from other jurisdictions like State v. Wood, Nicholson v. State, and United States v. Donley, which allow victim's statements of intent to divorce or fear to establish motive. Finally, the dissent argued that the majority's harmless error analysis was too superficial. Even without the contested statements, the State presented ample circumstantial evidence, including a neighbor's testimony contradicting the defendant's timeline (no shotgun blast heard), unrecovered camouflage clothing, forensic evidence showing the body was moved and bullet trajectories inconsistent with the defendant's account, and a manufacturer's report confirming the gun was not defective. This independent evidence was sufficient to support the second-degree murder conviction.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the strict application of hearsay exceptions, particularly present sense impression (Rule 803(1)) and state-of-mind (Rule 803(3)), in West Virginia. It establishes that these exceptions are not broad catch-alls and statements must meet precise requirements of contemporaneity and direct relevance to the declarant's current mental state, excluding past memories or beliefs. The decision also solidifies the procedural right under state statute to a jury panel "free from exception" before exercising peremptory challenges, providing greater protection than the federal constitutional minimum outlined in Ross v. Oklahoma. This implies that trial courts must be diligent in excusing biased jurors for cause, as an error in this regard will lead to reversal, regardless of whether the defendant ultimately secured an impartial jury via peremptory strikes. The dissent highlights a tension in evidentiary analysis, arguing for a broader interpretation of non-hearsay use for motive evidence.
