State v. Peterson
772 P.2d 513, 54 Wash. App. 75 (1989)
Rule of Law:
A defendant may be convicted as an accomplice even if the principal is a government agent who lacks criminal intent, provided the principal committed the physical acts constituting the crime and the defendant knowingly aided in those acts.
Facts:
- August Weiss, an informant, notified detectives that he was operating a methamphetamine laboratory and offered to cooperate.
- Weiss and undercover detectives went to the residence of Wade Peterson and Pamela Lane, where Weiss introduced the officers as his security.
- The following day, Weiss and the detectives returned to the residence to manufacture a batch of methamphetamine.
- The police supplied the necessary glassware and the chemical P2P to facilitate the process.
- Peterson was present during the manufacturing process and actively assisted Weiss in making the drugs.
- Once the methamphetamine was manufactured, police executed a search warrant at the residence.
Procedural Posture:
- The State charged Peterson with delivery of a controlled substance and possession with intent to manufacture or deliver in the trial court.
- The delivery charge was dismissed.
- The trial court provided the jury with an instruction on accomplice liability.
- The jury convicted Peterson of manufacturing or possessing a controlled substance.
- Peterson appealed the conviction to the Washington Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
Is it error to instruct a jury on accomplice liability when the principal who physically committed the crime was a police informant acting without criminal intent?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Judge Coleman
No, the trial court did not err because accomplice liability requires only that the principal commit the acts constituting the crime, not that the principal possess a specific criminal intent or be subject to prosecution. The court reasoned that under RCW 9A.08.020, an accomplice is liable for the conduct of another if they aid in the commission of the crime. While a principal must 'actually commit the crime' for accomplice liability to attach, this refers to the actus reus (the physical act) rather than the mens rea (mental state). The court distinguished the precedent set in Seattle v. Edwards, noting that Edwards applied to the credibility and corroboration of witness testimony, not the substantive liability of an accomplice. Since Weiss committed the statutory act of manufacturing a controlled substance, and Peterson knowingly aided him, Peterson is liable as an accomplice regardless of Weiss's status as an informant or his immunity from prosecution.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the scope of accomplice liability in the context of undercover police operations. It establishes that the 'criminal intent' of the principal is not a prerequisite for the liability of the helper, provided the substantive acts of the crime occur. This prevents defendants from using the 'legal impossibility' defense when they assist undercover agents or informants. By separating the accomplice's liability from the principal's prosecutability, the court ensures that those who knowingly facilitate criminal acts cannot escape conviction merely because the main perpetrator was working for the state.
