State v. Petersen
522 P.2d 912, 17 Or. App. 478 (1974)
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Rule of Law:
A participant in an illegal automobile race may be held criminally liable for manslaughter for a death resulting from the race, regardless of whether the participant's vehicle was the direct instrument of death or whether the victim was a fellow participant. A driver is 'involved in an accident' for hit-and-run purposes if their conduct was a contributing cause-in-fact to the collision, even without physical contact.
Facts:
- Defendant and Richard Wille agreed to engage in an automobile street race.
- Daniel Warren, the decedent, was a willing passenger in Richard Wille's Chevrolet Nova.
- Defendant, driving a pickup truck, and Wille raced down Southeast 148th Street at speeds estimated between 60-80 miles per hour in a 35 mph residential zone.
- As they approached the intersection with Powell Boulevard, Defendant began to decelerate and came to a stop in the left-turn lane.
- Wille continued past Defendant at a high rate of speed, ran a stop sign at the intersection, and was struck by a truck.
- The collision killed both Wille and his passenger, Warren.
- Following the collision, Defendant turned left and left the scene without rendering aid or providing his information.
Procedural Posture:
- Defendant was charged by indictment in the County of Multnomah with manslaughter, hit and run, and failure of a witness to furnish identification.
- Defendant filed a demurrer to the manslaughter count, which the trial court overruled.
- Following a trial to the court, Defendant was convicted on all three counts.
- The trial court merged the third count (failure of witness) with the second count (hit and run) for sentencing.
- Defendant appealed his convictions for manslaughter and hit and run to the Court of Appeals of Oregon.
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Issue:
Does a defendant's participation in an illegal street race constitute a legal cause of death for manslaughter when the defendant's vehicle was not the direct instrument of death and the victim was a willing passenger in the other race car?
Opinions:
Majority - Tanzer, J.
Yes. A defendant's participation in an illegal street race can constitute a legal cause of death for a manslaughter conviction. The court held that one who recklessly participates in an automobile race may be criminally responsible for a death resulting from it, even if their vehicle is not the direct instrument of death. The court's reasoning rests on the idea that each participant mutually engages in reckless conduct which causes the death, making both responsible regardless of which vehicle physically strikes the victim. The defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about the death, satisfying cause-in-fact. It was also the legal cause, as the death of a motorist or participant is precisely the type of harm the prohibition against street racing is intended to prevent. The court rejected the argument that the other driver's actions were a superseding cause, reasoning that they were a foreseeable consequence of the race. It also held that the victim's status as a participant does not negate the defendant's criminal liability, as tort concepts like assumption of risk are not defenses to criminal charges.
Dissenting - Schwab, C. J.
No. A defendant's reckless conduct does not legally cause the death of a willing participant in the mutually agreed-upon hazardous activity. The dissent argues that the ultimate question is one of legal causation, which is a policy determination. As a matter of policy, when individuals knowingly and voluntarily join in a reckless course of conduct, the law should not impose criminal liability for manslaughter on the survivors when another participant dies. The dissent distinguishes this from situations where a non-participant is harmed. Holding the surviving racer responsible for the death of a fellow participant, who willingly assumed the same risks, extends the concept of legal causation too far and is not a necessary deterrent.
Analysis:
This case establishes a broad standard for criminal liability based on mutual recklessness, particularly in the context of illegal street racing. It firmly separates criminal causation from tort principles like assumption of risk or contributory negligence, focusing instead on whether the defendant's conduct created a foreseeable risk of death. The decision expands the concept of legal causation, holding that a participant cannot escape liability simply because they 'withdrew' moments before a crash or because the victim was also a participant. This precedent makes it significantly easier for prosecutors to secure convictions against all participants in a street race that results in a fatality, regardless of their specific role in the final collision.
