State v. Parker
2008 WL 4329952, 991 So.2d 411 (2008)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
The exclusionary rule, which may suppress unduly suggestive eyewitness identifications, applies only to improper conduct by the state or its agents and is not triggered by the suggestive actions of a private citizen.
Facts:
- Andre Hart was shot and killed outside his mother's home at approximately 5:10 a.m.
- Hart's girlfriend, Venecia Anderson, was awakened by gunfire, looked out a window, and saw a man she knew as 'Tremayne' getting into a car.
- Anderson had known the man she identified as Tremayne for years, had seen him multiple times, and was aware he had previously threatened Hart.
- Hours after the shooting, Anderson gave police a detailed description of the man and the car she saw.
- Before Anderson could participate in a formal police line-up, the victim's brother, Aaron Stirrup, showed her a photograph of the defendant, Tremayne Parker.
- Subsequently, Anderson attended a live line-up conducted by police and positively identified Tremayne Parker as the man she saw at the crime scene.
Procedural Posture:
- Tremayne Parker was indicted in a Florida trial court for first-degree premeditated murder.
- Parker filed a motion to suppress Venecia Anderson's out-of-court and in-court identifications of him.
- The trial court granted Parker's motion to suppress the identifications.
- The State of Florida, as petitioner, sought a writ of certiorari from the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District, to quash the trial court's suppression order.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does the exclusionary rule require the suppression of an eyewitness identification when a private citizen, acting without state involvement, employs a suggestive procedure that precedes the identification?
Opinions:
Majority - Rothenberg, J.
No, the exclusionary rule does not require suppression of an eyewitness identification made suggestive by the actions of a private citizen. The two-part test for suppressing an out-of-court identification is only triggered when law enforcement or other state actors use an unnecessarily suggestive procedure. The purpose of the exclusionary rule in this context is to deter illegal state action, not to remedy the actions of private individuals. Since it was undisputed that the police did not employ any suggestive procedure and were unaware of the brother's actions, there was no state action to trigger a due process analysis. Therefore, the reliability of the identification is a matter for the jury to weigh, not a basis for suppression by the court.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies that the constitutional due process analysis for eyewitness identifications is predicated entirely on state action. It establishes that suggestive conduct by private parties does not trigger the Manson v. Brathwaite test for suppression, which is the standard framework for evaluating identification procedures. Consequently, the remedy for a defendant in such a situation is not exclusion of the evidence, but rather cross-examination and argument to the jury about the identification's unreliability. This ruling narrows the scope of pretrial suppression motions for identifications and reinforces that the exclusionary rule's primary function is to deter governmental misconduct.
