State of Iowa v. Edwin Bello Paredes
775 N.W.2d 554 (2009)
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Rule of Law:
A statement that tends to subject a declarant to criminal liability, even if not a full confession, is admissible as a hearsay exception if corroborating circumstances are sufficient for a reasonable person to believe the statement could be true. Statements that exculpate the only other possible suspect are inherently self-inculpatory.
Facts:
- Edwin Paredes and his sixteen-year-old girlfriend, Cassidy Millard, were the parents of a two-month-old infant.
- The infant was hospitalized and diagnosed with shaken-baby syndrome.
- Medical experts determined the injury occurred during a time when Paredes and Millard were the infant's sole caregivers, except for one 15-minute period.
- Paredes confessed to police that he had shaken the baby, stating he did so in order that Millard could have unsupervised visits with the child.
- Paredes later recanted his confession, then confessed again.
- After Paredes was charged, Millard called a social worker, Susan Gail, with whom she had prior contact.
- During the call, Millard stated that Paredes did not hurt the baby, hinted that she might have done it but couldn't remember, asked if she had Multiple Personality Disorder, and inquired about the legal consequences if she were found to be responsible.
- Millard also told the social worker that the baby cried all the time, she had yelled at him to 'shut up,' and had recently started spanking him.
Procedural Posture:
- The State of Iowa charged Edwin Paredes with child endangerment resulting in serious injury in the Iowa district court (trial court).
- Prior to trial, the State filed a motion in limine to exclude the testimony of social worker Susan Gail regarding her conversation with Cassidy Millard.
- The district court granted the motion, excluding the evidence as inadmissible hearsay.
- Paredes filed a motion to reconsider, which the district court denied, ruling that Millard's statements did not qualify for the statement-against-interest exception.
- Following a trial, a jury convicted Paredes.
- Paredes, as appellant, appealed to the Iowa Court of Appeals (intermediate appellate court), which affirmed his conviction.
- The Supreme Court of Iowa (highest court) granted further review.
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Issue:
Does a declarant's series of statements, which do not contain a direct admission of guilt but exculpate the only other suspect and inquire about criminal liability, qualify as an admissible statement against penal interest under Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.804(b)(3) when offered to exculpate the accused?
Opinions:
Majority - Appel, J.
Yes. A statement qualifies as a statement against penal interest under Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.804(b)(3) if it 'so far tended' to subject the declarant to criminal liability that a reasonable person would not have made it unless it were true. A statement need not be a full confession; when Millard exculpated Paredes, she was implicitly inculpating herself, as they were the only two caregivers during the relevant period. Her additional statements about spanking the infant and her inquiries about criminal sanctions further tended to subject her to liability. The rule's corroboration requirement is met not by proving the statement is true, but by showing sufficient circumstances of trustworthiness to allow a jury to assess its credibility. Here, Millard's connection to the crime, Paredes' recantation, and other testimony provided sufficient corroboration to require the admission of her statements. The exclusion of this evidence was not harmless error, as it was central to Paredes' only defense.
Dissenting - Cady, J.
No. The majority abdicates the court's essential gatekeeping function by allowing the jury to determine the admissibility of hearsay with questionable trustworthiness. When a declarant has mixed motives for making a statement—such as a desire to exonerate a loved one—the court should intensify its scrutiny, not pass the responsibility to the jury. Millard's statements were equivocal and motivated by a desire to help her boyfriend, which undermines the inherent trustworthiness required for a hearsay exception. The court should not have found these statements admissible. Furthermore, the majority improperly disregards Paredes' failure to establish the declarant's unavailability, a threshold requirement for the rule.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies Iowa's standard for admitting third-party statements against penal interest that are offered to exculpate a defendant. The court adopts a broad interpretation of what 'tends' to subject a person to criminal liability, moving beyond a requirement for a direct confession to include statements that are inculpatory by context. It also sets a relatively low bar for the corroboration requirement, emphasizing that the judge's role is to determine if the statement is plausible enough for the jury to hear, not to decide its ultimate credibility. This precedent will likely make it easier for criminal defendants in Iowa to introduce evidence suggesting another person committed the crime.
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