State v. Ott
686 P.2d 1001, 297 Or. 375, 1984 Ore. LEXIS 1488 (1984)
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Rule of Law:
When instructing a jury on the mitigating factor of extreme emotional disturbance (EED), the court must explain the phrase as a whole, focusing on a loss of self-control, and apply a hybrid standard where the reasonableness of the disturbance is viewed from the perspective of an ordinary person in the defendant's specific situation and circumstances.
Facts:
- The defendant, Ott, and his wife, Stephanie, had a volatile marriage marked by multiple separations.
- Stephanie engaged in several extramarital affairs, which caused Ott to become progressively more upset over time.
- During one incident where Ott discovered Stephanie with another man, a fight ensued, leading to Ott's arrest; a subsequent psychological evaluation noted he could exhibit psychotic behavior under stress.
- Despite a restraining order against him, Ott and Stephanie continued to associate and argue.
- In early April 1980, Ott and Stephanie met several times at a hospital where her son was a patient, giving Ott the impression their relationship was improving.
- After arranging to drive Stephanie home from the hospital, Ott was angered when her new lover appeared instead to pick her up.
- In a state of agitation, Ott retrieved a rifle he had stored nearby.
- Ott then pursued the truck carrying Stephanie and her lover, ran it off the road, and shot Stephanie three times, killing her.
Procedural Posture:
- The defendant, Ott, was charged with murder in an Oregon trial court.
- At trial, Ott did not contest that he intentionally killed the victim but argued for mitigation to manslaughter based on extreme emotional disturbance.
- The trial court provided the jury with a specific instruction defining the term 'extreme emotional disturbance'.
- The jury convicted Ott of murder.
- Ott appealed his conviction to a higher court, challenging the legality of the jury instruction.
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Issue:
Does a jury instruction on extreme emotional disturbance misstate the law when it defines the word 'extreme' with a restrictive dictionary definition and directs the jury to disregard the defendant's personal characteristics when assessing the reasonableness of the disturbance?
Opinions:
Majority - Lent, J.
Yes. A jury instruction on extreme emotional disturbance (EED) is erroneous when it isolates the word 'extreme' for a dictionary definition, as this improperly equates the mitigating factor with a state of insanity rather than a loss of self-control. The proper instruction should explain the entire term and apply a test that is both objective ('ordinary person') and subjective ('actor’s situation'). The trial court’s instruction, which used a dictionary definition of 'extreme' as 'outermost or furthest...final or last,' was misleading because it suggests a level of derangement akin to mental illness, contrary to the legislative intent of the EED defense. The EED defense was designed to replace the rigid 'heat of passion' doctrine with a more nuanced standard from the Model Penal Code. This standard requires the jury to assess the reasonableness of the explanation for the disturbance from the standpoint of an ordinary person who is in the 'actor's situation,' which includes personal characteristics like age, sex, and physical deformities, but excludes idiosyncratic personality traits like a bad temper. The instruction here failed to properly guide the jury in this hybrid analysis, constituting reversible error.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies the standard for the extreme emotional disturbance defense in Oregon, moving it away from the narrow, common law 'heat of passion' doctrine. By adopting the Model Penal Code's hybrid objective-subjective approach, the court establishes that a defendant's unique circumstances and characteristics (the 'situation') are relevant, but must be judged against an objective 'ordinary person' standard. This prevents the defense from becoming a purely subjective inquiry into an individual's temperament while still allowing for a more modern, psychological understanding of mitigation than the old provocation rule allowed. The case provides a crucial framework for trial courts on how to instruct juries, aiming to balance empathy for human frailty with the need for a uniform standard of conduct.
