State v. Oswalt
62 Wash. 2d 118, 381 P.2d 617 (1963)
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Rule of Law:
A witness cannot be impeached with extrinsic evidence on matters that are collateral to the principal issues of the case. A matter is considered collateral if the fact could not have been shown in evidence for any purpose independently of the contradiction.
Facts:
- On July 14, 1961, two armed men committed a robbery and burglary at the home and business of Frank L. Goodell in King County, Washington.
- One of the men forced Goodell to a Tradewell store, where he was made to open a safe and turn over money.
- The defendant, Oswalt, was identified as one of the two perpetrators.
- At trial, Oswalt presented an alibi defense through his witness, August Ardiss, a Portland restaurant owner.
- Ardiss testified that Oswalt was in his Portland restaurant on July 14, 1961, making it impossible for him to have been in Seattle at the time of the crime.
- On cross-examination by the state, Ardiss testified that he believed Oswalt had been in his restaurant 'every day' for the preceding two months.
Procedural Posture:
- Oswalt was tried in a Washington state trial court on charges of robbery and first degree burglary.
- During the trial, the court admitted, over defense objection, the rebuttal testimony of a police detective.
- The jury convicted Oswalt on both counts.
- Oswalt (defendant-appellant) appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court of Washington.
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Issue:
Does the introduction of rebuttal testimony to contradict an alibi witness's statement about the defendant's whereabouts a month prior to the crime constitute improper impeachment on a collateral matter?
Opinions:
Majority - Hamilton, J.
Yes. The introduction of rebuttal testimony to contradict a witness on a matter collateral to the principal issue is improper and constitutes reversible error if it is prejudicial. The sole issue raised by the alibi witness's direct testimony was the defendant's location on July 14, 1961. The witness's statement on cross-examination that the defendant had been in his restaurant 'every day' for the prior two months was collateral to this central issue. The state could not introduce extrinsic evidence (the detective's testimony about seeing the defendant in Seattle a month earlier) for the sole purpose of contradicting the witness on this collateral point. The court applied the test for collateralness: whether the contradicting fact could have been shown in evidence for any purpose independently of the contradiction. Here, the defendant’s presence in Seattle a month before the crime was not independently relevant to his alibi for the date of the crime, and the state's argument that it showed 'planning' was too speculative. Because the state's case rested on identification and the defense rested on alibi, improperly discrediting the key alibi witness was a prejudicial error that affected the outcome of the case.
Analysis:
This case reinforces the well-established evidentiary rule against impeachment on collateral matters. It clarifies that a party, through cross-examination, cannot create a collateral issue and then use extrinsic evidence to impeach the witness on that manufactured point. The decision protects the integrity of the trial process by preventing jury confusion and avoiding unfair surprise to witnesses who may be unprepared to defend statements on tangential issues. The ruling underscores the risk a cross-examiner takes: when inquiring into collateral matters, the examiner is generally 'concluded by the answers given' and cannot call another witness just to rebut them.
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