State v. Ormond
786 So.2d 187, 2001 WL 417176 (2001)
Rule of Law:
A defendant may not assert as prejudicial error a favorable ruling on his own motion, such as withdrawing a guilty plea after being advised of the consequences. The right to self-representation must be clearly and unequivocally asserted, and requests made on the day of trial are subject to the trial court's discretion. Mandatory minimum sentences under the Habitual Offender Law are presumed constitutional and require clear and convincing evidence of exceptional circumstances for a downward departure.
Facts:
- On April 21, 1999, Betty Lundgren returned home to find her rear patio door, French doors, and a bedroom window broken, and several items, including gold chains and rings, missing.
- On the same day, Linda Bigner returned home between 9:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. to encounter a man, later identified as James Ormond, who pointed a gun at her before leaving her ransacked home.
- Linda Bigner reported missing items including coins, a gun, bullets, and various watches; police found pried windows and blood on frames outside her house.
- Officer David Mascaro responded to a report from a barmaid at The Ski Lodge, near Bigner's house, about a gun clip and watch found there, and was advised by a maintenance man that no items were in the bathroom just before the suspect entered.
- Officer Mascaro observed James Ormond at the bar, who matched Linda Bigner's description, had loose change, and dried blood on his collar.
- Officer Mascaro stopped Ormond as he tried to leave the bar, found a .380 automatic handgun in his pocket, which matched the serial number of a gun missing from Bigner's home.
- After being advised of his rights, James Ormond admitted to committing burglaries to satisfy his need for alcohol and cocaine, and both Betty Lundgren and Linda Bigner identified him and items recovered from him as their stolen property.
- Fingerprints taken from Linda Bigner's house were later analyzed and found to match those of James Ormond.
Procedural Posture:
- On May 19, 1999, James Ormond was charged in a two-count bill of information with aggravated burglary (count 1) and simple burglary of an inhabited dwelling (count 2).
- On September 27, 1999, Ormond entered guilty pleas to both counts after a Boykin colloquy and was sentenced to 15 years on count 1 and 12 years on count 2, concurrent, plus restitution.
- On September 30, 1999, the trial court granted Ormond's oral motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.
- On October 21, 1999, Ormond went to trial by jury and was found guilty as charged on each count.
- On November 4, 1999, pursuant to a multiple bill, Ormond was adjudicated a fourth felony offender.
- On November 4, 1999, the court sentenced Ormond on count 1 to life imprisonment at hard labor and on count 2 to 12 years at hard labor, concurrent, without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence.
- James Ormond appealed his convictions and sentences to the Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fifth Circuit.
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Issue:
Did the trial court err by allowing James Ormond to withdraw his guilty pleas, by denying his request to represent himself made on the day of trial, or by imposing a mandatory minimum life sentence as a fourth felony offender under the Habitual Offender Law?
Opinions:
Majority - Gothard, Judge
No, the trial court did not err by allowing James Ormond to withdraw his guilty pleas. The defendant himself, after being fully advised of his rights and repeatedly warned by both the trial court and his attorney about the consequences, voluntarily and intelligently moved to withdraw his previously entered guilty pleas. A defendant cannot create an error and then assert it as prejudicial on appeal. The court cited State v. Bourque for the principle that a defendant may not cause the error which he later asserts as prejudicial. No, the trial court did not err by denying James Ormond's request to represent himself. While the Sixth Amendment grants the right to counsel and the right to personally defend oneself (Faretta v. California), the right to counsel of choice is not absolute (State v. Wille). Any waiver of counsel to proceed pro se must be knowing, intelligent, clear, and unequivocal (McKaskle v. Wiggins). The exercise of this right must be done in a reasonable manner and at an appropriate stage of the proceedings. Requests for pro se representation made on the day of trial are addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court judge (State v. Seiss). Ormond's only clear requests for self-representation came on the day of trial, and considering the disruptive and dilatory consequences of such a late request, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying it, especially since Ormond was permitted to actively participate with appointed counsel. No, the trial court did not err by imposing a mandatory minimum life sentence as a fourth felony offender. Both federal and state constitutions prohibit excessive punishment, but the Habitual Offender Law (La. R.S. 15:529.1) has been found constitutional in its entirety, and its minimum sentences are presumed constitutional (State v. Johnson, State v. Dorthey). A court may only depart from a mandatory minimum sentence if there is clear and convincing evidence to rebut this presumption of constitutionality. This requires a showing that the defendant is exceptional due to unusual circumstances, rendering him a victim of the legislature's failure to tailor sentences meaningfully to culpability, offense gravity, and case circumstances. Ormond made no such showing, and downward departures are rare. Therefore, the imposed sentence was not error.
Analysis:
This case significantly reinforces the 'invited error' doctrine, preventing defendants from challenging court actions they themselves requested after due warning. It also clarifies the high standard for asserting the right to self-representation, emphasizing that requests must be unequivocal and timely, with trial courts retaining broad discretion for late assertions. Furthermore, the decision solidifies the robust presumption of constitutionality for mandatory minimum sentences under Louisiana's Habitual Offender Law, setting a very high bar for defendants to demonstrate 'exceptional circumstances' for a downward departure. This strict interpretation limits avenues for appellate challenges to sentencing and procedural rulings, promoting judicial efficiency and adherence to legislative intent.
