State v. Olsen
108 Utah 377, 160 A.L.R. 508, 160 P.2d 427 (1945)
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Rule of Law:
The act of a driver falling asleep at the wheel of an automobile, especially when accompanied by premonitory symptoms or circumstances indicating the likelihood of sleep, constitutes sufficient evidence of criminal negligence to warrant submission of an involuntary manslaughter charge to a jury.
Facts:
- Defendant, employed as a truck driver at Kearns Army Base, was ordered to drive a truck to the Union Pacific Station.
- Just after leaving Kearns, defendant became drowsy and opened the windows of the truck for a breeze to combat this feeling.
- Defendant stopped for a semaphore light at 5th West and North Temple Streets in Salt Lake City.
- With the green light, defendant started to drive up a viaduct and had just shifted into third gear when she fell asleep.
- The truck went up over the right curb onto the sidewalk, traveling some distance.
- The truck struck and killed a child who was playing on the sidewalk.
Procedural Posture:
- Defendant was charged with involuntary manslaughter in the District Court of Salt Lake County.
- The jury returned a verdict of guilty of involuntary manslaughter.
- The District Court imposed a sentence of one year in the county jail.
- Defendant filed a motion to dismiss and to direct a verdict of not guilty, which was denied by the District Court.
- Defendant appealed the verdict and sentence to the Supreme Court of Utah.
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Issue:
Does the act of a driver falling asleep at the wheel of an automobile, even without explicit proof of prior warning, constitute sufficient evidence of criminal negligence (specifically, a marked disregard for the safety of others) to submit the question of guilt for involuntary manslaughter to a jury?
Opinions:
Majority - Larson, Chief Justice
Yes, the act of a driver falling asleep at the wheel, especially when there are prior warnings or circumstances indicating the likelihood of sleep, constitutes sufficient evidence of criminal negligence to present the question of guilt to a jury. The court affirmed the judgment, holding that the mere fact of going to sleep at the wheel, without more, at least presents a question for the jury as to whether the driver was negligent. The court reasoned that while one cannot be liable for actions during unconsciousness, one is responsible for allowing oneself to become unconscious and thus unable to avoid an accident. Citing numerous precedents like People v. Robinson and Bushnell v. Bushnell, the court emphasized that the approach of sleep is usually indicated by premonitory symptoms, and an ordinarily prudent person would know not to drive while weary or sleepy. Allowing oneself to go to sleep while driving manifests a marked disregard for the safety of others.
Concurring - McDonough, Justice
Yes, a jury of reasonable men was justified in finding that the defendant acted in marked disregard of the safety of others, making it appropriate to present the question to them. McDonough concurred, albeit with some doubt, that the evidence was sufficient for a jury to find marked disregard. He noted that the jury had testimony about the defendant feeling drowsy earlier, the specific route, and her actions just prior to the accident (observing a stop light, shifting gears, then immediately falling asleep). From these facts, and from common experience, the jury could infer that insistent premonitions of sleep had assailed her, and she continued to drive despite knowing her condition. He further clarified that these facts do not create a presumption compelling the jury to find so, but merely permit such an inference.
Concurring - Wolfe, Justice
Yes, while a mere showing that a driver fell asleep at the wheel is not by itself sufficient to show criminal negligence, the surrounding circumstances in this case allowed the jury to find the defendant drove in marked disregard for the safety of others. Justice Wolfe concurred in the result but disagreed with the majority's statement that 'the fact of going to sleep at the wheel of an automobile, without more, at least presents a question for the jury as to whether the driver was negligent' when applied to a criminal case requiring 'marked disregard for the safety of others.' He argued that courts, even in civil cases requiring more than ordinary negligence, consider preceding events. The critical inquiry is whether the driver continued operating the vehicle after sufficient prior warning of sleep, demonstrating reckless disregard. In this case, the defendant's admission of drowsiness earlier, opening windows, knowledge of the truck's sleep-inducing hum, the warm day, and the timing of the accident (after lunch) provided sufficient circumstantial evidence for the jury to infer a prior warning and a marked disregard for safety.
Concurring - Wade, Justice
Yes, the jury could reasonably infer that the driver had felt sleep coming on and continued to drive despite the warning, thus acting in marked disregard for the safety of others. Justice Wade concurred with Chief Justice Larson and also agreed with Justice Wolfe's framing of the issue: whether the driver continued after a prior warning, constituting a marked disregard. He emphasized that sleep generally does not overtake a driver without some prior warning. While he found no specific facts in this case, other than the act of falling asleep itself and common experience, that tended to prove she had a warning of sleep's approach at the exact time she fell asleep, he concluded that the mere fact of falling asleep while driving, in the absence of a strong showing to the contrary, is sufficient for a jury to infer prior warning and marked disregard.
Analysis:
This case is significant for clarifying the standard of criminal negligence when a driver falls asleep at the wheel, especially in an involuntary manslaughter context. It moves beyond simple negligence, requiring a showing of 'marked disregard for the safety of others.' The court established that while the mere act of falling asleep is highly probative, the inquiry often centers on whether the driver had prior warning of drowsiness and continued to drive, thereby consciously disregarding the risk. This precedent allows juries to infer criminal negligence from circumstantial evidence surrounding the act of falling asleep, shifting the burden to the defendant to provide an excusable explanation, thus making it easier for prosecutors to pursue charges in similar vehicular homicide cases where driver fatigue is a factor.
