State v. Newman
353 Or. 632, 302 P.3d 435, 2013 WL 2370589 (2013)
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Rule of Law:
The 'driving' element of the offense of Driving Under the Influence of Intoxicants (DUII) requires proof of a voluntary act. Consequently, evidence that a defendant was unconscious or 'sleep driving' due to a condition like somnambulism is relevant and admissible to negate this element.
Facts:
- Peter Michael Newman met friends for dinner, anticipating that he would consume alcohol.
- As a precaution, Newman left his car parked by his apartment and walked to the restaurant.
- After dinner, Newman's friends drove him home, where he went to sleep.
- Later that evening, a police officer observed Newman's car being driven erratically, running a red light, and straddling two traffic lanes.
- Upon stopping the vehicle, the officer noted Newman had bloodshot, watery eyes, slow, slurred speech, and a strong odor of alcohol.
- A subsequent Breathalyzer test revealed Newman's blood alcohol content was 0.15 percent.
- Newman stated he had a history of sleepwalking but had no recollection of leaving his apartment, getting into his car, or driving on the night of the incident.
- An expert in sleep medicine was prepared to testify that Newman suffers from a sleepwalking disorder and was likely 'sleep driving,' an unconscious act.
Procedural Posture:
- The State of Oregon charged Peter Michael Newman in trial court with felony DUII, reckless driving, and recklessly endangering another person.
- Before trial, the state filed a motion in limine to exclude any testimony regarding Newman's sleepwalking disorder.
- The trial court granted the state's motion, ruling that DUII is a strict-liability offense and the evidence of sleep driving was therefore irrelevant.
- The state dismissed the other charges, and following a bench trial, the court convicted Newman of felony DUII.
- Newman, as appellant, appealed to the Oregon Court of Appeals, arguing the trial court erred in excluding his evidence.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment, agreeing that DUII is a strict-liability offense for all its elements.
- The Oregon Supreme Court granted Newman's petition for review.
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Issue:
Does the offense of Driving Under the Influence of Intoxicants (DUII) require the state to prove that the defendant performed the voluntary act of driving, making evidence of 'sleep driving' relevant and admissible to challenge this element?
Opinions:
Majority - Baldwin, J.
Yes. The offense of DUII requires proof of a voluntary act of driving, and thus evidence of 'sleep driving' is relevant and was improperly excluded. The court reasoned that Oregon's criminal code establishes a 'minimal requirement for criminal liability' which is 'the performance by a person of conduct which includes a voluntary act' (ORS 161.095(1)). A 'voluntary act' is defined as 'a bodily movement performed consciously.' The court determined that acts performed while asleep, such as 'sleep driving,' are not conscious and therefore not voluntary. The lower courts erred by relying on State v. Miller, which held that DUII is a strict liability offense regarding the mental state for the intoxication element, but did not eliminate the fundamental requirement of a voluntary act for the driving element. The voluntary act must be linked to the proscribed conduct (driving), not merely to a preceding condition (drinking), although a prior voluntary act like drinking could suffice if it foreseeably led to the involuntary driving.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the critical distinction between the actus reus (the voluntary act) and the mens rea (the culpable mental state) in the context of strict liability offenses. It establishes that even when a statute dispenses with a required mental state, the prosecution must still prove that the defendant's prohibited conduct was the result of a conscious, volitional act. The ruling significantly impacts DUII prosecutions by allowing defendants to introduce evidence of automatism, such as sleepwalking, to argue they did not commit the physical act of driving voluntarily. This reinforces the foundational principle of criminal law that liability cannot attach to involuntary movements a person cannot control.
