State v. Morris
2004 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 111, 2004 WL 736847, 677 N.W.2d 787 (2004)
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Rule of Law:
The act of taking a motor vehicle without consent and abandoning it shortly thereafter upon pursuit by police is insufficient circumstantial evidence, on its own, to prove the specific intent to permanently deprive the owner of the vehicle required for a theft conviction.
Facts:
- On October 6, 2001, at 4:30 a.m., Brian Gonzales started his truck and left it running and unattended in front of his home to warm up.
- Shortly after Gonzales went back inside his house, he heard the truck's engine revving and saw an unknown person driving it away.
- Approximately thirty minutes later and five miles from Gonzales's residence, a police officer spotted the stolen truck.
- The officer, Aaron McClelland, pursued the truck, which was being driven by Willis Elbert Morris.
- Morris stopped the truck, exited the vehicle, and fled on foot toward nearby houses.
- Police, with the assistance of a K-9 unit, subsequently found Morris hiding on the porch of a house.
Procedural Posture:
- Willis Elbert Morris was charged with second-degree theft as a habitual offender in an Iowa district court (trial court).
- The case was tried before a jury, which was also instructed on the lesser-included offense of operating a motor vehicle without the owner's consent.
- The jury returned a verdict finding Morris guilty of second-degree theft.
- Morris, as appellant, appealed his conviction to the Iowa Court of Appeals (intermediate appellate court).
- The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, finding insufficient evidence of intent to permanently deprive.
- The State, as appellant, sought further review from the Supreme Court of Iowa (highest court), which was granted.
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Issue:
Does a defendant's act of taking a vehicle without permission, driving it a short distance for a short time, and then abandoning it to flee from police constitute sufficient evidence to prove the specific intent to permanently deprive the owner of the vehicle, as required for a theft conviction?
Opinions:
Majority - Per Curiam
No. The evidence was insufficient to prove that the defendant intended to permanently deprive the owner of the vehicle. Although apprehension shortly after the taking does not preclude a finding of intent, it severely limits the circumstantial evidence from which intent can be inferred. The court, relying on State v. Schminkey, reasoned that abandoning the vehicle and fleeing upon observing police was an act that would ordinarily assure the truck would be returned to its owner, thus negating an inference of intent to permanently deprive.
Dissenting - Larson, J.
Yes. The evidence was sufficient for a jury to infer the requisite intent to permanently deprive. The majority improperly relies on State v. Schminkey, a guilty-plea case where inferences are disfavored, whereas in a jury trial, inferences from circumstantial evidence are standard. The well-established principle that possession of recently stolen property creates an inference of theft should apply. The short duration of possession could have been interpreted by the jury as a result of efficient police work, not a lack of intent, and it was a rational inference for the jury to make.
Concurring - Carter, J.
No. Although the reasoning of State v. Schminkey is troubling and the dissent is correct that taking a vehicle should create a strong inference of intent, the totality of the evidence in this specific case is insufficient to sustain a guilty verdict on the greater charge. While disagreeing that Schminkey's analysis is limited to guilty pleas, the justice concurs in the result because the specific facts do not support a conviction for theft beyond a reasonable doubt, though the defendant should be found guilty of the lesser-included offense.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the high evidentiary bar required to prove the element of 'intent to permanently deprive' in motor vehicle theft cases based solely on circumstantial evidence. It solidifies the precedent from State v. Schminkey, extending its application from guilty pleas to jury trials and making it more difficult for prosecutors to secure theft convictions when a vehicle is recovered quickly. The case reinforces the distinction between the greater offense of theft and the lesser offense of operating without consent (joyriding), requiring prosecutors to present more than just the taking and brief possession to prove the specific intent for theft.
