State v. Morgan
340 S.E.2d 84, 315 N.C. 626 (1986)
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Rule of Law:
Evidence of a defendant's prior extrinsic acts of assaultive conduct is not probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness and is therefore inadmissible for impeachment purposes under Rule 608(b). Furthermore, such evidence cannot be used under Rule 404(b) to prove a defendant's character for violence in order to show they acted in conformity therewith by being the aggressor in the incident for which they are on trial.
Facts:
- In the fall of 1983, defendant Morgan and the deceased, Austin Yates Harrell, entered into a partnership for a produce and flea market business called 'Geno's,' where Morgan also lived.
- On July 4, 1984, Harrell told a witness he was going to 'close the place down,' and Morgan later told the same witness that Harrell was going to close him down and his name would be 'in the headlines before midnight.'
- According to an eyewitness, Harrell was setting up a table and chair outside the business when Morgan threw open the front door and shot Harrell with a shotgun from a distance of about four feet.
- Morgan testified that he and Harrell had a volatile relationship and that on the day of the shooting, Harrell, who was intoxicated and had a history of manic depression, had been acting belligerently.
- Morgan claimed that just before the shooting, Harrell had thrown a hatchet at him, pursued him with a knife, and was coming through the front doorway threatening to kill him.
- Morgan admitted that when he shot Harrell, Harrell did not have a weapon in his hand.
Procedural Posture:
- The State of North Carolina prosecuted Morgan in a state trial court.
- A jury convicted Morgan of first-degree murder.
- Morgan, as the appellant, appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court of North Carolina, asserting three assignments of error.
- The State of North Carolina is the appellee.
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Issue:
Does allowing the prosecution to cross-examine a defendant about a prior, uncharged assault with a shotgun violate the rules of evidence when the defendant has claimed self-defense?
Opinions:
Majority - Meyer, Justice.
No, allowing the cross-examination was an error, but it was harmless. The cross-examination regarding Morgan's prior assaultive conduct was improper under Rule 608(b) because extrinsic instances of assaultive behavior are not probative of a witness's character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. The evidence was also inadmissible under Rule 404(b) because the State's rationale—that the prior assault showed Morgan's propensity for violence and therefore he was the aggressor—is precisely the type of character conformity argument the rule prohibits. However, the error was harmless and does not warrant a new trial because the State presented strong eyewitness testimony and physical evidence that negated the self-defense claim, and the improper questioning was brief.
Dissenting - Exum, Justice.
No, the error was not harmless and warrants a new trial. The degree of Morgan's culpability was a close question, and his version of events, supported by evidence of Harrell's size, mental state, and intoxication, was plausible. The improper admission of the prior assault evidence was highly prejudicial, as it likely inclined the jury to convict simply because Morgan was shown to be a 'bad man,' thereby drawing their attention from the legitimate issues of self-defense and potentially lesser degrees of homicide like manslaughter or second-degree murder. Given the closeness of the case, there is a reasonable possibility that this error tilted the scales and led to a conviction for first-degree murder.
Analysis:
This case provides a critical clarification of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence, distinguishing the functions of Rule 608(b) for impeaching credibility and Rule 404(b) for substantive purposes. The court firmly establishes that assaultive conduct is not probative of truthfulness, thus limiting the scope of cross-examination under Rule 608(b). The decision reinforces the core principle of Rule 404(b): the prosecution cannot use a defendant's past 'bad acts' to argue that they have a propensity to commit the crime charged. The case also illustrates the high bar for 'plain error' in jury instructions, showing that even a failure to give a required instruction might not lead to reversal if not properly objected to at trial and if the evidence of guilt is substantial.
