State v. Miranda
776 N.W.2d 77, 2009 S.D. LEXIS 180, 2009 SD 105 (2009)
Rule of Law:
A person can be convicted of third-degree burglary under SDCL 22-32-8 if they initially enter a premises with a license or privilege, but then unlawfully remain in the unoccupied structure with the intent to commit a crime after their license or privilege to be there has terminated.
Facts:
- In January 2008, Adan Miranda and his wife were patrons at the American Legion (Legion) in Pierre, South Dakota.
- After an argument with his wife, Miranda left their vehicle and returned to the Legion, remaining inside after normal closing hours.
- The bartender, Shannon Nelson, performed a final walk-through around 3:00 a.m. but did not check all rooms, including the dark party room where Miranda had hidden, before arming the alarm and leaving.
- At approximately 3:23 a.m., Pierre police officers responded to a silent burglar alarm activated at the Legion.
- Officer Walz observed Miranda suddenly open a door and run out of the Legion, leading to a short chase and his arrest.
- Police discovered evidence inside the Legion, including hinge pins removed from the liquor room door, broken French doors, a knocked-over sign, scattered straws, an opened lottery drawer, an open walk-in cooler door with the light on, and a light on in the manager’s office where extra liquor was stored.
- The manager, Don Henrichsen, confirmed that there was no employee reason to remove hinge pins from the liquor room door and noted that locks on other meeting room doors were bent.
Procedural Posture:
- On March 17, 2008, the State of South Dakota filed an amended complaint against Adan Miranda in the Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit, Hughes County, South Dakota, charging him with third degree burglary, obstructing a law enforcement officer, and intentional damage to private property.
- The State subsequently filed a Part II Information for Habitual Offender against Miranda due to his prior third-degree burglary conviction in October 2001.
- Miranda moved to dismiss the charges.
- The State moved to introduce other acts evidence pursuant to SDCL 19-12-5.
- The circuit court denied Miranda’s motion to dismiss and granted the State’s motion to admit other acts evidence.
- A jury convicted Miranda on all counts.
- Miranda appealed the circuit court's orders to the Supreme Court of South Dakota, arguing the denial of his motion to dismiss the burglary charge and the admission of other acts evidence were errors.
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Issue:
1. Does a person commit third-degree burglary under SDCL 22-32-8 if they initially enter a public establishment with a license or privilege, but then unlawfully remain in the establishment after it closes with the intent to commit a crime? 2. Did the circuit court abuse its discretion by admitting other acts evidence, specifically a prior burglary conviction, under SDCL 19-12-5 to show intent, preparation, plan, and knowledge?
Opinions:
Majority - MILLER, Retired Justice
1. Yes, a person can be convicted of third-degree burglary under SDCL 22-32-8 even if they initially entered a public establishment lawfully, if they unlawfully remain in the unoccupied structure with the intent to commit a crime after their license or privilege to be there has terminated. The Court reviewed the legislative history of SDCL 22-32-8, noting its evolution from common law and the 2005 amendment that added the language "unless the premises are, at the time, open to the public or the person is licensed or privileged to enter or remain." This amendment codified prior precedent (e.g., In re T.J.E.) that interpreted "remains" in the burglary statutes as "unlawfully remains." The Court emphasized that the statute's use of "enters or remains" signifies two distinct means of committing trespass for burglary. Miranda's argument that initial lawful entry prevents a burglary conviction would render the word "remains" meaningless, which is contrary to principles of statutory construction. Thus, when Miranda entered the Legion during business hours but then hid and remained after closing time without permission, he remained without a license or privilege within the meaning of the statute. 2. No, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in granting the State’s motion to admit other acts evidence from Miranda’s previous burglary conviction. The Court applied the required two-step procedure for admitting evidence under SDCL 19-12-5 (Rule 404(b)): first, the evidence must be relevant to a material issue, and second, its probative value must not be substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect (State v. Owen). The Court found that the record supported the trial court's ruling that the other acts evidence was material—showing intent, preparation, plan, and knowledge, and lack of mistake or accident—and that its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect. The Court also noted that jury instructions diminished potential prejudice by clarifying the limited purpose for which the evidence could be considered.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the interpretation of South Dakota's third-degree burglary statute, SDCL 22-32-8, particularly regarding the "remains" element. It establishes that an initial lawful entry does not provide a perpetual defense against burglary if an individual unlawfully stays in a premises after their license or privilege expires, especially with criminal intent. This ruling reinforces the legislative intent to criminalize individuals who secrete themselves in establishments after closing hours with criminal purpose, preventing a narrow reading from undermining the statute's broader reach. The decision also affirms the trial court's discretion in admitting prior bad acts evidence under Rule 404(b) when the proper balancing test is applied and adequate limiting instructions are given to the jury, providing guidance for future evidentiary challenges.
