State v. Miranda
245 Conn. 209, 715 A.2d 680, 1998 Conn. LEXIS 230 (1998)
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Rule of Law:
A person who is not a biological or legal parent but who establishes a familial relationship with a child and voluntarily assumes responsibility for the child's care and welfare has a common-law legal duty to protect that child from abuse. The failure to act on this duty can be the basis for criminal liability for assault.
Facts:
- In September 1992, Santos Miranda began living with his sixteen-year-old girlfriend and her two children, a two-year-old son and an infant daughter (the victim).
- Miranda was not the biological father of either child, but he took care of them, considered himself their stepfather, and represented himself as such to hospital staff.
- Over several weeks, the four-month-old victim sustained multiple severe injuries, including skull fractures, rib fractures, a brachial plexus injury, and a rectal tear.
- The nature of these injuries would have caused inconsolable screaming and noticeable physical deformities, such as swelling and bruising.
- Miranda was aware of the child's various injuries, including bruises, a swollen head, and a rectal tear, and he knew these conditions created a substantial risk of death.
- Despite this knowledge, Miranda failed to promptly notify authorities, seek medical care for the child, remove her from the abusive circumstances, or otherwise protect her from future harm.
- On January 27, 1993, Miranda called 911 to report the child was choking, which led to the discovery of the extensive, non-accidental injuries by medical professionals.
Procedural Posture:
- Santos Miranda was convicted in a state trial court of six counts of assault in the first degree and one count of risk of injury to a child.
- Miranda (as appellant) appealed the convictions to the Connecticut Appellate Court.
- The Appellate Court affirmed the risk of injury conviction but reversed the six assault convictions, concluding Miranda (as appellee in that court) had no legal duty to protect the child.
- The State of Connecticut (as petitioner) was granted certification to appeal to the Supreme Court of Connecticut to review the Appellate Court's decision regarding the legal duty for the assault convictions.
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Issue:
Does a person who is not a biological or legal parent, but who establishes a familial relationship with a child and voluntarily assumes responsibility for the child's care, have a legal duty to protect the child from abuse, the breach of which can result in criminal liability for assault under General Statutes § 53a-59(a)(3)?
Opinions:
Majority - Katz, J.
Yes. A person who establishes a family-like relationship with a child and voluntarily assumes responsibility for that child's care has a common-law legal duty to protect the child from abuse, and a breach of that duty can be the basis for a criminal assault conviction. The court reasoned that criminal liability can arise from an omission to act when there is a legal duty to do so. While parents have an undisputed duty, this duty can be extended to others who establish familial relationships and assume responsibility for a child's care. This common-law duty is consistent with public policy and other statutes aimed at protecting children, reflecting the reality of non-traditional family arrangements. The defendant's relationship with the child and his mother, and his self-professed role as a stepfather, were sufficient to create this legal duty to act.
Dissenting - Berdon, J.
No. The first-degree assault statute, § 53a-59(a)(3), does not criminalize a failure to act, and the court oversteps its judicial authority by creating a new common-law crime. The legislature specifically criminalized the failure to protect a child in the risk of injury statute, § 53-21, for which the defendant was properly convicted. By imposing a common-law duty under the assault statute, the majority is fashioning a new substantive offense, which is a legislative function that the state's penal code expressly prohibits courts from doing. Furthermore, the legislature's recent consideration (and failure to pass) a bill criminalizing the facilitation of child abuse indicates that existing law, particularly the assault statute, was not understood to cover such omissions.
Concurring - Palmer, J.
Yes. I join the majority's opinion that a legal duty exists under these circumstances. However, a serious question remains as to whether the defendant had fair warning that his failure to act could constitute first-degree assault, as required by the due process clauses of the federal and state constitutions. The legal duty recognized today has never before been expressly established in this state, and applying this novel construction of a criminal statute retroactively may violate due process. Because the defendant will have the opportunity to raise this constitutional claim on remand, I concur with the majority's conclusion.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - McDonald, J.
Yes, a duty existed, but the application of the first-degree assault statute needs clarification. A person in an intimate, cohabitating relationship with a child's parent has a duty to prevent the ongoing abuse of a helpless child in the household. However, it is a significant leap to conclude that a failure to seek medical aid or report abuse constitutes first-degree assault without further analysis. The application of the assault statute in this manner is a novel construction that raises due process concerns regarding fair notice. I concur with the remand to allow the defendant to raise these issues.
Analysis:
This decision significantly expands the scope of criminal liability for omissions by extending the legal duty to protect a child beyond biological parents and legal guardians. The court established that a de facto parental relationship, characterized by cohabitation and the voluntary assumption of care, is sufficient to create an affirmative duty to act. This precedent adapts common-law principles to modern, non-traditional family structures, holding individuals in parent-like roles accountable for failing to prevent harm to children in their household. The ruling will likely influence future prosecutions in cases of child abuse involving stepparents, unmarried partners, and other caregivers who have established a familial relationship with a child.
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