State v. Meado
472 N.W.2d 567, 1991 Wisc. App. LEXIS 932, 163 Wis. 2d 789 (1991)
Rule of Law:
The term 'obtains title to property' under Wisconsin's theft by false representation statute (sec. 943.20(1)(d), Stats.) is not limited to gaining absolute legal ownership but includes obtaining beneficial possession and use of property through a fraudulent lease agreement.
Facts:
- Robert W. Meado obtained a 1987 Chevrolet van from Gordie Boucher Chevrolet through a lease agreement.
- Meado provided Gordie Boucher Chevrolet with a check for $923.91 as a down payment for the van.
- The check was not honored because the bank account from which it was drawn was closed before Meado wrote the check.
- Meado provided a false home address to Gordie Boucher Chevrolet, never having resided there.
Procedural Posture:
- Robert W. Meado was charged with theft by false representation, contrary to sec. 943.20(1)(d), Stats., in a criminal complaint.
- Meado filed a motion in the trial court to dismiss the complaint, arguing it failed to set forth essential facts for the offense because he had only obtained a lease, not title, to the van.
- Meado failed to appear at three preliminary hearings, leading to the State bringing a bail jumping charge against him.
- Meado subsequently waived the preliminary hearing and entered a no contest plea to the theft by false representation charge in the trial court.
- In exchange for his plea, the State agreed to dismiss the bail jumping charge and recommended probation with restitution.
- Meado stipulated that the facts in the complaint would serve as the factual basis for his plea and withdrew his earlier motion to dismiss the complaint.
- The trial court accepted Meado's plea, made a finding of guilty, withheld sentence, and placed him on probation for four years with various conditions.
- Meado's probation was later revoked, and he was sentenced to six years' imprisonment.
- Meado filed a postconviction motion pursuant to sec. 974.06, Stats., in the trial court, seeking to vacate the judgments and dismiss the action on the ground that the factual basis for the guilty finding utterly failed to establish the charged violation.
- The trial court interpreted Meado's postconviction motion as a challenge to the sufficiency of the complaint, concluded he had waived that challenge by withdrawing his earlier motion to dismiss, and denied postconviction relief.
- In the alternative, the trial court found that the facts were sufficient to accept the plea because Meado did 'obtain title' within the meaning of sec. 943.20(1)(d), Stats.
- Meado appealed the judgments of conviction and the order denying postconviction relief to the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, challenging the factual basis for his plea.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does obtaining a lease agreement for property by intentionally false representation constitute 'obtaining title to property' within the meaning of Wisconsin's theft by false representation statute, sec. 943.20(1)(d), Stats.?
Opinions:
Majority - ANDERSON, J.
Yes, obtaining a lease agreement by intentionally false representation constitutes 'obtaining title to property' under sec. 943.20(1)(d), Stats. The court determined that the phrase 'obtains title to property' is ambiguous, as reasonably well-informed people could disagree on its meaning. To ascertain legislative intent, the court engaged in statutory construction, considering the statute's scope, history, context, and purpose. The court referenced _Whitmore v. State_, which interpreted a predecessor statute and held that a conditional sales contract, where legal title was retained for security, conferred a 'sufficient property interest' to support a conviction for obtaining money by false pretenses, rejecting a narrow interpretation requiring absolute title. The court reasoned that the 1955 revision to the criminal code, which changed the language to 'obtains title to property,' was intended to simplify, not substantively alter, the law. The purpose of sec. 943.20(1)(d) is to prohibit fraudulent transactions and protect citizens from swindlers who acquire property by willful misrepresentation, focusing on the method of misappropriation rather than absolute legal title. A narrow, technical reading of 'title' would frustrate this legislative intent by allowing cunning thieves to escape liability as long as official title remained with the owner as security. The court also distinguished sec. 943.20(1)(e), which specifically addresses failure to return leased property, by noting that subsection (e) lacks the fraudulent representation element central to subsection (d). Therefore, the court concluded that 'obtains title to property' includes cases where a person induces another to part with property under a lease arrangement through fraudulent representation, as Meado gained the benefit of the van by such means.
Analysis:
This case significantly broadens the interpretation of 'obtains title to property' in Wisconsin's theft by false representation statute, ensuring that the law applies to situations where a defendant acquires beneficial use or control over property through fraud, even if formal legal title is not transferred. It reinforces the principle that statutes designed to prevent fraud should be construed broadly to give effect to their remedial purpose and prevent evasions based on technical distinctions of property interests. The decision clarifies that the focus of the statute is on the fraudulent acquisition and deprivation of an owner's property, regardless of the precise legal form of the property interest transferred. This will likely impact future cases involving various forms of fraudulent acquisition where an accused party gains practical control or use of property without obtaining absolute legal ownership.
