State v. McVay
132 A. 436 (1926)
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Rule of Law:
An individual can be an accessory before the fact to involuntary manslaughter if they counsel or procure the commission of a criminally negligent act that results in death, even if the resulting death was unintentional.
Facts:
- The Steamer Mackinac was scheduled to carry several hundred passengers from Pawtucket to Newport.
- The ship's boiler was known to be worn, corroded, defective, and unsafe.
- Before the voyage began, in Pawtucket, defendant Kelley allegedly aided, counseled, commanded, and procured the ship's captain, George W. McVay, and engineer, John A. Grant, to operate the vessel using the defective boiler.
- Kelley was not present on the vessel during its voyage.
- During the trip near Newport, the boiler exploded due to the generation of steam.
- The explosion and subsequent release of steam killed numerous passengers, including the three victims for whom the indictments were brought.
Procedural Posture:
- The State of Rhode Island brought three indictments against George W. McVay and John A. Grant as principals for manslaughter.
- The same indictments charged George J. Kelley as an accessory before the fact.
- In the Superior Court (trial court), Kelley filed a demurrer, arguing that as a matter of law, there can be no accessory before the fact to involuntary manslaughter.
- The trial court overruled other grounds of demurrer but did not rule on this specific question.
- The trial court certified the unresolved question of law as being of sufficient doubt and importance for determination by the Supreme Court of Rhode Island before trial.
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Issue:
May a defendant be indicted and convicted of being an accessory before the fact to the crime of manslaughter arising through criminal negligence?
Opinions:
Majority - Barrows, J.
Yes. A defendant may be indicted as an accessory before the fact to manslaughter by criminal negligence. The court reasoned that while one cannot be an accessory to a killing resulting from a sudden, unpremeditated act, manslaughter arising from gross negligence is different. The key distinction is that the underlying negligent act itself can be premeditated, counseled, and procured. The court clarified that the term 'involuntary' in 'involuntary manslaughter' characterizes the unintentional result (the death), not the act of negligence, which can be a voluntary and conscious choice. Similarly, legal 'malice' does not require ill will but can be inferred from a willful disregard for the safety of others. Therefore, it is legally possible for an individual like Kelley to have intentionally and 'maliciously' (in the legal sense) counseled the principals to commit the grossly negligent act of operating a known-to-be-defective boiler, making him an accessory to the resulting deaths.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies the scope of accomplice liability for unintentional crimes. It establishes that the premeditation required for an accessory before the fact charge attaches to the underlying criminal act (the gross negligence), not the ultimate result (the death). This precedent allows prosecutors to charge individuals who are removed from the scene of a tragedy but who knowingly and recklessly directed others to perform the acts that led to it. The ruling prevents a logical loophole where a person could intentionally command a reckless act but escape liability for the resulting homicide simply because the death itself was not specifically intended.
