State of Arizona v. Loris Lee McVay

Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc
127 Ariz. 450, 622 P.2d 9 (1980)

ELI5:

Rule of Law:

A witness's testimony that confirms the truthfulness of another's statement is inadmissible hearsay if the confirmation is based on the out-of-court statements of other declarants not present for cross-examination.

Facts:

In late October 1977, Loris Lee McVay was introduced to Thomas (Pappy) Pitts and shared living quarters with him for a short time.
Pitts owned a custom-built motorcycle which he kept at the premises.
Around November 26, 1977, McVay met Diana Farris and stayed with her for a few days.
On December 2, 1977, Farris observed McVay wearing a leather jacket that appeared too small for him and saw a bulge in his pocket shaped like a small handgun.
Later that night, Farris discovered that her .22 caliber derringer was missing from her bedroom.
On December 5, 1977, Pitts was found dead in his home from two gunshot wounds to the head from a small caliber gun. His leather jacket and motorcycle were missing.
On December 6, 1977, McVay called Farris and told her, 'I had to kill a man and take his motorcycle.'
After his arrest, McVay was held in the Maricopa County Jail with inmates Kenny Knorr and Porter Smithson.

Procedural Posture:

Loris Lee McVay was charged with first-degree murder in a state trial court.
During the jury trial, the state called Detective Klettlinger as a rebuttal witness.
The defense objected to the detective's testimony about confirming an informant's story as hearsay, but the trial court overruled the objection and admitted the evidence for a limited purpose.
The jury found McVay guilty of first-degree murder.
The trial court entered a judgment of guilt and imposed a sentence of death.
McVay (appellant) appealed the conviction and sentence to the Supreme Court of Arizona.

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Issue:

Does a detective's testimony, which confirms the truthfulness of an informant's statements based on out-of-court conversations with other law enforcement agencies, constitute inadmissible hearsay requiring reversal?

Opinions:

Majority - Cameron, Justice

Yes. A detective’s opinion testimony confirming the truthfulness of an informant's statement is inadmissible hearsay when that opinion is derived from out-of-court statements made by other declarants. The detective's testimony was an indirect method of introducing statements from authorities in Pima County and California, who were not available for cross-examination. The effect was to bring hearsay statements into evidence in the form of the detective's opinion, which was erroneously admitted. This error was not harmless because the informant's (Knorr's) credibility was critical; his testimony was the only evidence supporting the 'lying in wait' element required for a first-degree murder conviction. Improperly bolstering Knorr's credibility with hearsay may have been the decisive factor for the jury, creating a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different had the error not occurred.

Analysis:

This case clarifies that the rule against hearsay cannot be circumvented by framing testimony as an opinion about another witness's veracity if that opinion is based on out-of-court declarations. It establishes that testimony about the results of an investigation can constitute 'backdoor' hearsay. The decision reinforces the importance of the defendant's right to confront and cross-examine declarants whose statements are used to prove the truth of a matter asserted. It serves as a precedent against using law enforcement testimony to indirectly corroborate an informant's story with information gathered from other non-testifying individuals.

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