State v. McKnight
576 S.E.2d 168, 352 S.C. 635, 2003 S.C. LEXIS 23 (2003)
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Rule of Law:
Under South Carolina law, a viable fetus is considered a 'child' for the purposes of the homicide by child abuse statute. A mother can be convicted of homicide by child abuse if her illegal drug use during pregnancy causes the death of her viable fetus.
Facts:
- On May 15, 1999, Regina McKnight gave birth to a stillborn baby girl.
- The fetus was estimated to be at a gestational age of 34-37 weeks, which is considered viable.
- An autopsy of the fetus revealed the presence of benzoylecgonine, a metabolite of cocaine.
- A pathologist testified that the cocaine must have come from the mother and that the fetus died one to three days before delivery.
- The official cause of death was determined to be intrauterine fetal demise with cocaine consumption as a contributing factor.
- McKnight admitted to an investigator that she knew she was pregnant and had been using cocaine on weekends when she could get it.
Procedural Posture:
- Regina McKnight was indicted for homicide by child abuse in a South Carolina trial court.
- A first trial held from January 8-12, 2002, resulted in a mistrial.
- At a second trial held from May 14-16, 2001, a jury found McKnight guilty.
- The trial court sentenced McKnight to twenty years imprisonment, with the sentence suspended upon the service of twelve years.
- McKnight, as the Appellant, appealed her conviction to the Supreme Court of South Carolina.
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Issue:
Does the South Carolina homicide by child abuse statute apply to a mother who causes the death of her viable fetus by ingesting cocaine during pregnancy?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Waller
Yes, the South Carolina homicide by child abuse statute applies to a mother who causes the death of her viable fetus by ingesting cocaine. The court holds that its prior rulings, particularly in Whitner v. State, established that a viable fetus is a 'child' under the state's child abuse laws. When the legislature later amended the homicide by child abuse statute, it was aware of these judicial interpretations and chose not to explicitly exclude viable fetuses, thereby implicitly accepting this definition. The court found there was sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that McKnight's cocaine use caused the death and that her actions manifested an 'extreme indifference to human life,' given the well-known dangers of cocaine use during pregnancy. The court also rejected McKnight's constitutional challenges, holding that she had fair notice her conduct was illegal and that the right to privacy does not protect illegal activity that harms a viable fetus.
Dissenting - Justice Moore
No, the homicide by child abuse statute should not be applied in this case. The dissent argues that the legislature could not have intended for this statute, which carries a sentence of twenty years to life, to apply to a mother causing a stillbirth. It points to South Carolina's criminal abortion statute, which specifically penalizes the intentional killing of a viable fetus by its mother with a maximum punishment of two years. This vast and disproportionate difference in punishment suggests the legislature recognized the unique context of a feticide by the mother and intended the less severe statute to govern. The dissent maintains that expanding a criminal statute to cover conduct not clearly within its scope is a legislative function, not a judicial one, and that penal statutes must be strictly construed in the defendant's favor.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies South Carolina's legal position that a viable fetus is a person for the purposes of criminal homicide law. By extending the precedent from child endangerment cases like Whitner to homicide, the court affirmed that a mother's prenatal conduct resulting in a stillbirth can lead to a murder-equivalent conviction. The case has significant implications for reproductive and maternal rights, creating a precedent that could be used to prosecute pregnant individuals for a variety of behaviors deemed harmful to a viable fetus. It intensifies the debate over fetal personhood and the criminalization of pregnancy, raising policy concerns that such prosecutions may deter pregnant women from seeking necessary prenatal care.
