State v. McGhee
179 So. 3d 739, 15 La.App. 3 Cir. 285, 2015 La. App. LEXIS 2198 (2015)
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Rule of Law:
To be convicted as a principal to a crime, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused personally possessed the requisite mental state for the crime, as intent cannot be inferred from a co-defendant. Mere presence at the scene of a crime or association with co-defendants is insufficient to establish the intent to aid and abet.
Facts:
- Jessica Guillot went missing in September 2013 and has never been found.
- Laura Stelly, Jessica's mother, reported her missing on September 11, 2013, after Asa Bentley came to her house looking for Jessica because 'she had got him for $175,' and Stelly found Jessica's house ransacked.
- Cecil Cooper, Jessica's fiancé, last saw her on September 6, 2013, and the next day, Asa Bentley and Chadwick McGhee gave Cooper a ride home, during which McGhee stated Cooper's 'girl [was] down bad for what she did' and Bentley claimed Jessica stole his cocaine.
- James Crystal testified that he saw Jessica by a shed on September 7 or 8, 2013, and Chadwick McGhee was with Asa Bentley when Bentley came to the shed looking for Jessica.
- Tamika Williams, a co-defendant, testified that a few nights after Bentley threatened to kill Jessica, Bentley picked her up, met with Willie Price and Donnie Edwards, and Price and Edwards dragged Jessica from their car and handed her over to Bentley.
- Williams further testified that Bentley dragged Jessica into his Dodge Durango, choked her, and demanded his money back while Edwards drove, and McGhee remained in the other car, not getting out.
- Williams stated that when Bentley, Edwards, Price, and McGhee arrived at Williams’ mother’s house later, McGhee had his head down 'like he was crying or sad or something,' and Bentley told him, 'Whatever I tell you to do, you do it.'
- Chadwick McGhee was interviewed by detectives and denied any knowledge of the victim taking anything from Bentley or being in a car with her in the Mansura area, claiming he had not seen her since a barbecue around the time she disappeared.
Procedural Posture:
- Chadwick McGhee was charged by bill of indictment with one count of second-degree kidnapping on November 14, 2013.
- Following a jury trial, Chadwick McGhee was found guilty of the lesser included offense of simple kidnapping.
- Chadwick McGhee filed a Motion for New Trial with the trial court, arguing the verdict was contrary to law and evidence, and new evidence was discovered.
- The trial court denied Chadwick McGhee's Motion for New Trial.
- Chadwick McGhee was adjudicated a fourth felony offender and sentenced to life imprisonment.
- Chadwick McGhee appealed his conviction to the Louisiana Court of Appeal, Third Circuit.
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Issue:
Was the evidence sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Chadwick McGhee had the requisite criminal intent to be a principal to simple kidnapping?
Opinions:
Majority - Gremillion, Judge
No, the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Chadwick McGhee had the requisite criminal intent to be a principal to simple kidnapping. The court applied the `Jackson v. Virginia` standard, requiring a review of whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Under La.R.S. 14:24, a person is a principal if they directly commit the act, aid and abet, or counsel/procure the crime. Since no evidence showed McGhee personally committed, counseled, or procured the kidnapping, he could only be a principal if he 'aided and abetted.' Citing `State v. Brooks` and `State v. Holmes`, the court reiterated that an individual can only be convicted as a principal for crimes for which they personally possess the requisite mental state, and this intent cannot be inferred from a co-conspirator. Simple kidnapping is a general intent crime. The State failed to prove McGhee's personal intent to aid or abet the kidnapping. While McGhee was present with Bentley, there was no proof he knew Bentley intended to kidnap or harm the victim; Bentley's statements to Cooper were ambiguous, and Bentley's threats to Williams were not made in McGhee's presence. McGhee remained in a separate car during the alleged kidnapping and later appeared sad. Bentley's post-incident statement to McGhee, 'Whatever I tell you to do, you do it,' was ambiguous as to 'it' and therefore insufficient to prove prior intent. The court concluded that mere presence during a crime does not make an individual a principal, and the State's evidence amounted to 'guilt by association,' which is not recognized in Louisiana law. Therefore, McGhee's conviction was vacated due to insufficient evidence of personal criminal intent.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the demanding standard for proving criminal intent, particularly when a defendant is accused as a principal rather than the direct perpetrator. It reinforces that mere presence at the scene of a crime, even with knowledge that a crime is being committed, is not enough for a conviction without specific, individualized evidence of the defendant's personal intent to aid and abet the criminal act. The decision underscores the prohibition against inferring criminal intent from co-defendants, thereby safeguarding individuals from convictions based solely on their association with perpetrators. This ruling is crucial for maintaining due process and ensuring that criminal liability is attributed based on a defendant's personal mental state and actions, rather than their proximity or perceived affiliation with others involved in a crime.
