State v. McCurry-Bey
2009 WL 4277249, 2009 Mo. App. LEXIS 1658, 298 S.W.3d 898 (2009)
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Rule of Law:
A trial court's finding that a defendant is competent to stand trial is not supported by substantial evidence when the court relies solely on its own lay observations to disregard unanimous and uncontroverted expert testimony, corroborated by historical records, that the defendant is incompetent.
Facts:
- Paul Wesley McCurry-Bey was accused of statutory rape, sodomy, and incest.
- At trial, McCurry-Bey testified in his own defense, providing an alibi that he was living at a residential drug and alcohol abuse treatment facility when the offenses occurred.
- McCurry-Bey testified that the facility's rules prohibited residents from having contact with family members and that he had traveled to El Paso, Texas, as part of the program.
- After the trial concluded, McCurry-Bey's counsel learned that McCurry-Bey had an IQ of 55, which was confirmed by school records from when McCurry-Bey was sixteen years old.
- A court-appointed psychologist, Dr. Scott, evaluated McCurry-Bey and found his IQ to be 55, concluding he was mildly mentally retarded and that his ability to reason was so impaired he could not assist his counsel.
- A psychologist retained by the State, Dr. Armour, also evaluated McCurry-Bey, found a verbal IQ of 58, and concluded he was mildly mentally retarded and did not have the ability to understand the legal process.
- Both psychologists opined that McCurry-Bey's condition was chronic and that he was not malingering or exaggerating his symptoms.
Procedural Posture:
- Paul Wesley McCurry-Bey was tried by a jury in the trial court and found guilty of first-degree statutory rape, first-degree statutory sodomy, and incest.
- At the sentencing hearing, before the sentence was imposed, McCurry-Bey's counsel moved for a competency evaluation.
- The trial court ordered an evaluation and committed McCurry-Bey to the Department of Mental Health (DMH) for that purpose.
- After a competency hearing featuring testimony from two psychologists, the trial court found McCurry-Bey competent to stand trial and be sentenced.
- The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of twenty years, twenty years, and five years.
- McCurry-Bey (Appellant) appealed the judgment and sentence to the Missouri Court of Appeals, an intermediate appellate court, arguing the trial court erred in its competency finding.
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Issue:
Does a trial court err in finding a defendant competent to stand trial when it disregards the unanimous opinions of both a court-appointed psychologist and a state-retained psychologist, along with corroborating historical records, in favor of its own observations of the defendant's demeanor and testimony?
Opinions:
Majority - Hoff, J.
Yes. A trial court errs when it finds a defendant competent to stand trial by disregarding unanimous expert evidence of incompetence in favor of its own observations. The standard for competence requires that a defendant has a sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings. Here, McCurry-Bey met his burden of proving incompetence by a preponderance of the evidence through the testimony of two expert psychologists—one appointed by the court and one retained by the State—who both concluded he was mentally retarded and unable to understand the legal process or assist in his defense. This expert testimony was corroborated by historical school records showing a consistently low IQ. The trial court's reliance on its own observations of McCurry-Bey's testimony and the timing of the competency claim was an insufficient basis to disregard the entire weight of the uncontroverted professional evidence.
Analysis:
This decision significantly limits a trial court's discretion in competency hearings by clarifying that a judge's personal observations cannot override unanimous, corroborated expert testimony. It reinforces the principle that competency is a clinical determination that should be based on professional psychological evaluation, not merely on a defendant's courtroom demeanor. The ruling establishes a strong precedent that an appellate court will reverse a competency finding if it is not supported by substantial evidence, particularly when all expert opinions are aligned. This will likely make it more difficult for trial courts to find defendants competent in the face of uncontradicted evidence of a significant, chronic intellectual disability.
