State v. McClendon
2014 WL 530058, 133 So.3d 239, 2013 La.App. 4 Cir. 1454 (2014)
Rule of Law:
Police officers lack reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop when the only factors present are a person's presence in a high-crime area, an 'anxious' demeanor, and a hurried attempt to leave upon seeing police, as these factors alone do not provide specific and articulable facts warranting a stop under the Fourth Amendment and Louisiana Constitution.
Facts:
- At approximately 7:15 p.m. on September 10, 2013, Jonathan McClendon and a companion were standing near the corner of Second and Dryades Streets in New Orleans.
- Sergeant Gillard described the neighborhood of Second and Dryades Streets as one of the worst in the Sixth Police District, known for illegal conduct such as shootings, robberies, stabbings, fights, and narcotics sales.
- As a lead police vehicle approached Second Street, Mr. McClendon observed it and became 'kind of anxious' and 'kind of hurried to get from the area'.
- Mr. McClendon then entered a vehicle driven by his companion, which attempted to pull off.
- The lead police unit blocked in the vehicle containing Mr. McClendon and his companion, preventing it from proceeding down the road.
- After the stop, Sergeant Gillard approached the vehicle from the passenger side and observed Mr. McClendon fumbling with his waistband area and looking around nervously.
- Officers removed Mr. McClendon from the vehicle and conducted a limited weapons frisk, during which he became visibly nervous and started shaking.
- Sergeant Gillard felt a bulge in Mr. McClendon’s right front pocket, at which point Mr. McClendon blurted out that 'it was drugs', and crack cocaine wrapped in plastic was recovered from his pocket.
Procedural Posture:
- Jonathan McClendon filed a motion to suppress evidence seized from his person and statements he made, alleging an unconstitutional seizure.
- The district judge (trial court) heard testimony from Sergeant Eric Gillard and granted Mr. McClendon's motion to suppress.
- The prosecution applied for a writ of certiorari to the Louisiana Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, to review the district judge's decision to suppress the evidence.
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Issue:
Does the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 5 of the Louisiana Constitution permit police officers to conduct an investigatory stop based solely on a person's presence in a high-crime area, an anxious reaction, and a hurried attempt to leave upon seeing police, thereby justifying the seizure and subsequent recovery of evidence?
Opinions:
Majority - Paul A. Bonin, Judge
No, the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 5 of the Louisiana Constitution do not permit police officers to conduct an investigatory stop based solely on a person's presence in a high-crime area, an anxious reaction, and a hurried attempt to leave upon seeing police, as these facts do not amount to reasonable suspicion. The court conducted a de novo review of the district judge’s ruling and affirmed the suppression of evidence. A seizure occurred the moment the police unit blocked in Mr. McClendon's vehicle, as this constituted an actual restraint on his movement and a reasonable person would not feel free to leave. Any evidence or observations gathered after this point, such as an expired brake tag or fumbling in the waistband, cannot be used to justify the initial seizure. The prosecution bears the burden of proving that reasonable suspicion existed prior to the seizure. The factors cited by the police—Mr. McClendon's presence in a high-crime area, his anxious reaction, and his hurried attempt to leave—are insufficient to establish the requisite reasonable suspicion. While these factors can be considered, presence in a high-crime area alone is insufficient, and an individual's subjective nervous reaction to police, even when combined with a hurried departure, does not, without more, provide specific and articulable facts of criminal activity. Police must articulate facts that move beyond an 'inchoate, unparticularized hunch.' The court concluded that the social cost of suppressing the evidence was significantly outweighed by the need to deter police from effectuating investigatory stops without reasonable suspicion, and thus the exclusionary rule was properly applied. The subsequent search and statements were deemed not sufficiently attenuated from the unlawful seizure.
Analysis:
This case reinforces the stringent requirements for establishing reasonable suspicion under Terry v. Ohio for investigatory stops. It clarifies that while factors like presence in a high-crime area, nervousness, and attempts to avoid police are relevant, they are insufficient on their own to justify a seizure. The ruling emphasizes that the timing of the seizure is critical, prohibiting the use of after-acquired evidence to retroactively justify an unconstitutional stop. This decision protects individual liberties by demanding specific and articulable facts of criminal activity, preventing arbitrary stops based on vague hunches or innocent conduct, and upholding the deterrence function of the exclusionary rule.
