State v. Mast
713 S.W.2d 601, 1986 Mo. App. LEXIS 4390 (1986)
Rule of Law:
A person commits unlawful assembly if they knowingly assemble with six or more persons with a common intent, inferable from overt acts, to violate criminal laws with force or violence, and can be convicted by knowingly remaining in such an assembly even without individually committing violent acts. A person also commits refusal to disperse if, being present at an unlawful assembly, they knowingly fail or refuse to obey a lawful command to depart, where a command to 'break it up' constitutes a reasonable dispersal order.
Facts:
- On October 31, 1984, Halloween night, Steve Mast, a student at Northeast Missouri State College, drove to the town of Maywood with a friend, Donnie Martin, to participate in the traditional Halloween gathering, aware of Maywood's reputation for "anything goes on Halloween."
- Mast arrived in Maywood around 5:45 p.m., dressed in ROTC army fatigues with his face covered in a black substance, possessing bottle rockets, while Martin carried a can of spray paint.
- Deputy Sheriff Jerry Callow and Special Deputy Steve Waters warned Mast and his friends to "keep it down and keep it within reason," explaining that seven or more gathered constituted an illegal assembly, and confiscated Martin's spray paint.
- Throughout the course of the night, various unlawful activities transpired, including bottle rockets set off near gas pumps and in the direction of the police car, a house being egged, a stop sign placed on a porch, and fire bombs, M-80s, eggs, bottle rockets, and a beer bottle thrown at officers.
- Officers observed Mast set off one bottle rocket away from the crowd and buildings, which was considered an unlawful act.
- At one point in the evening, Deputy Callow told the crowd they were getting unruly and committing unlawful acts, and "asked them to break it up."
- In response to Callow's request, the crowd divided into groups of four or five but did not separate far from each other and regrouped shortly after the officers departed.
- Mast drove his car across Mr. Seals' lawn.
Procedural Posture:
- An information was filed against Steve Mast in Lewis County.
- A change of venue was granted, and a jury trial was subsequently held in the Knox County Circuit Court.
- The jury convicted Steve Mast on Count I, unlawful assembly, and on Count II, refusal to disperse.
- Mast was sentenced to a $250.00 fine plus costs for unlawful assembly and two days in jail plus a $100.00 fine plus costs for refusal to disperse.
- Mast appealed his convictions to the Missouri Court of Appeals, contending that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions and that the trial court erred in denying his motions for judgments of acquittal.
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Issue:
1. Does sufficient evidence exist to support a conviction for unlawful assembly where the defendant was present at a gathering that became disorderly, knew of the gathering's reputation for lawless acts, fired one bottle rocket, and the group's common unlawful purpose was inferred from overt acts? 2. Does sufficient evidence exist to support a conviction for refusal to disperse where the defendant was present at an unlawful assembly, heard a law enforcement officer command the crowd to 'break it up,' and subsequently regrouped with the crowd after a brief separation?
Opinions:
Majority - Dowd, Judge
Yes, sufficient evidence exists to support a conviction for unlawful assembly because Mast knowingly assembled with others whose common unlawful purpose was evident from their overt acts, and he remained with the group after it became unlawful, even participating in an unlawful act himself. The court, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, determined that although the gathering in Maywood initially was lawful, the participants' purpose changed as the night progressed, leading to disturbances of public peace and interference with others' rights through acts like throwing fire bombs, bottle rockets, and eggs. Citing In Re Wagner, the court reiterated that a person can be guilty of unlawful assembly by knowingly joining or remaining with a group after it has become unlawful, even without individually committing violent acts. The court found that the statutory requirement of "agreement" does not necessitate express verbal consent but can be inferred from the group's collective "overt acts," which demonstrate a common unlawful purpose. Mast's awareness of Maywood's Halloween reputation, his presence at the assembly, and his own acts of firing a bottle rocket and driving across a lawn, were sufficient to show his knowing participation and adoption of the group's unlawful conduct. The court emphasized that the statute aims to discourage assemblies that endanger public peace and excite fear. Yes, sufficient evidence exists to support a conviction for refusal to disperse because Mast was present at an unlawful assembly, heard a lawful command to "break it up," and knowingly failed to obey by rejoining the crowd after a brief separation. The court found that Mast was at the scene of an unlawful assembly and heard Deputy Callow's order to "break it up." A person of reasonable intelligence would understand "break it up" to mean departing from the area, and the statute does not require a specific designated location for dispersal. Mast's action of regrouping with the crowd after a brief, non-dispersing separation constituted a knowing failure or refusal to obey the lawful command. Therefore, the evidence, viewed favorably to the state, was sufficient to sustain his conviction for failure to disperse.
Analysis:
This case provides significant clarification on the interpretation and application of Missouri's unlawful assembly and refusal to disperse statutes. It establishes that the element of "agreement" for unlawful assembly does not require explicit verbal consent but can be inferred from the collective overt acts and conduct of the participants, broadening the scope of what constitutes such an agreement. Furthermore, the ruling clarifies that a law enforcement command to "break it up" is a sufficiently clear and lawful order to disperse, and a temporary, non-substantive separation followed by regrouping constitutes a knowing failure to obey. This decision has the potential to impact future cases by making it easier for prosecutors to secure convictions against individuals who knowingly participate in or fail to disassociate from disorderly public gatherings, reinforcing the duty of individuals to remove themselves from unlawful assemblies when ordered.
