State v. Maestas
652 P.2d 903 (1982)
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Rule of Law:
Under Utah's statutory law, the criminal culpability required to prove an attempt to commit a crime is the same as the culpability required for the commission of the completed offense itself. Therefore, attempted murder does not require a higher or more specific intent than that required for the crime of murder.
Facts:
- On February 20, 1980, a defendant robbed a bank and fled in a van.
- Sergeant Cecil Throckmorton of the Salt Lake City Police Department positioned himself on a street island to intercept the defendant's van.
- As the defendant's van passed, Sergeant Throckmorton fired his shotgun into the front of the van in an attempt to disable it.
- A few seconds later, as he was driving away, the defendant leaned out of the van's window holding a .38-caliber revolver.
- The defendant then fired the revolver in the direction of Sergeant Throckmorton.
- The defendant drove several more blocks before crashing into a parked car and being apprehended by other officers.
Procedural Posture:
- The State charged the defendant with attempted first degree murder in a Utah trial court.
- At the end of the trial, the jury returned a verdict finding the defendant guilty.
- After the verdict, the defendant renewed a motion to dismiss the charge.
- The trial court judge granted the defendant's motion and set aside the jury's guilty verdict on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence of intent to kill.
- The State appealed the trial court's order of dismissal to the Utah Supreme Court, seeking to have the jury's verdict reinstated.
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Issue:
Does Utah's statutory definition of 'attempt' require a higher level of intent for the crime of attempted first degree murder than the 'intentionally or knowingly' standard required for the completed crime of first degree murder?
Opinions:
Majority - Hall, C.J.
No. The level of intent required for attempted murder is the same as that required for murder. The defendant’s argument that an attempt crime requires a higher, more 'specific intent' than the completed crime is based on a common law rule that has been explicitly abolished by Utah's statutory criminal code. The Utah statute defining 'attempt' requires only 'the kind of culpability otherwise required for the commission of the offense.' Because first degree murder requires an 'intentionally or knowingly' mental state, attempted first degree murder requires the same. The court found substantial evidence, including eyewitness testimony from multiple officers, from which a jury could reasonably infer the defendant acted with the requisite intent when he fired his revolver at Sergeant Throckmorton. Therefore, the trial court erred by substituting its judgment for the jury's and dismissing the guilty verdict.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the principle that statutory law supersedes common law doctrines in criminal matters within the jurisdiction. By rejecting the common law's heightened intent requirement for attempt crimes, the court affirmed the primacy of the legislature in defining criminal offenses. This ruling simplifies the prosecution of attempt crimes in Utah, as the state does not need to prove a mental state for an attempt that is different or more specific than the mental state required for the completed crime. It reinforces the role of the jury as the primary fact-finder and limits a trial court's power to overturn a verdict to situations where there is no substantial evidence to support it.
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