State v. MacK
2002 WL 215629, 66 S.W.3d 706, 2002 Mo. LEXIS 21 (2002)
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Rule of Law:
A 'ruse' drug checkpoint, where police use deceptive signs to divert drivers to an exit where all vehicles are stopped, does not violate the Fourth Amendment because the act of taking the 'bait' exit can itself, in the totality of the circumstances, generate the individualized suspicion required to justify the stop.
Facts:
- On June 24, 1999, the City of Troy police department set up a drug checkpoint on the Old Cap Au Gris exit ramp off northbound Highway 61.
- Police placed signs on the highway stating 'DRUG ENFORCEMENT CHECKPOINT ONE MILE AHEAD' to intentionally mislead drivers into believing the checkpoint was at the next exit, Highway 47.
- The Old Cap Au Gris exit was chosen because it was isolated, offered no gas or food services, and had no activities scheduled at the local church or school that evening.
- The police plan was to stop all vehicles taking the Old Cap Au Gris exit.
- Around 11:00 p.m., Todd Mack was driving northbound on Highway 61.
- Mack suddenly veered off the highway to take the Old Cap Au Gris exit, almost missing the turn.
- Upon being stopped, police observed that Mack was nervous, had glazed eyes, and smelled of alcohol.
- After arresting Mack's passenger on an outstanding warrant, Mack gave permission to search his vehicle, which revealed narcotics and drug paraphernalia.
Procedural Posture:
- The State charged Todd Mack with three counts of possession of a controlled substance in the trial court.
- Mack filed a motion to suppress the evidence, which the trial court initially denied.
- Following the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Indianapolis v. Edmond, Mack filed a motion for reconsideration.
- The trial court granted the motion for reconsideration and suppressed the evidence.
- The State filed an interlocutory appeal of the suppression order to the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District.
- The Court of Appeals transferred the case to the Supreme Court of Missouri because of the general interest and importance of the issue.
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Issue:
Does stopping every vehicle that takes a specific highway exit, after being diverted by signs for a fictitious drug checkpoint ahead, violate the Fourth Amendment's requirement for individualized suspicion as established in Indianapolis v. Edmond?
Opinions:
Majority - Stephen N. Limbaugh, Jr.
No, stopping vehicles at a ruse checkpoint does not violate the Fourth Amendment under these circumstances because the scheme is designed to generate individualized suspicion. Unlike the checkpoint in Indianapolis v. Edmond, which involved stopping vehicles at random, this checkpoint stopped only those drivers who took 'the bait.' The court reasoned that the act of taking an isolated, service-less exit to avoid a supposed checkpoint ahead is unusual conduct that allows an officer to reasonably conclude criminal activity may be afoot, thus satisfying the 'individualized suspicion' standard for a Terry stop. This suspicion was further bolstered by the 'totality of the circumstances,' including the late hour and Mack’s specific, erratic driving in suddenly veering to take the exit.
Dissenting - Laura Denvir Stith
Yes, the ruse checkpoint violates the Fourth Amendment because its primary purpose is general crime control, which Indianapolis v. Edmond expressly forbids without pre-existing individualized suspicion. The ruse does not create 'individualized' suspicion but rather 'group suspicion' for every driver who takes the exit for any number of innocent reasons, such as avoiding delay, fear of police, or simply heading to a local destination. Creating a 'Catch-22' where a driver is stopped for either proceeding through an unconstitutional checkpoint or avoiding it is fundamentally unreasonable. The stop was based on a general police scheme, not on suspicion particular to Mack, and the evidence should be suppressed.
Analysis:
This decision establishes a significant carve-out to the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Indianapolis v. Edmond, which generally prohibits drug checkpoints whose primary purpose is ordinary crime control. The court holds that a checkpoint's methodology can itself create the necessary individualized suspicion, thereby making it constitutional. By validating the 'ruse checkpoint' tactic, the decision provides law enforcement with a method to circumvent Edmond's prohibition, reasoning that a driver's reaction to police deception can be grounds for a stop. This creates a potential conflict with federal circuit court rulings and blurs the line between impermissible general crime-control checkpoints and permissible stops based on suspicion.
