State v. Lozier
101 Ohio St. 3d 161, 803 N.E.2d 770 (2004)
Rule of Law:
The sentence enhancement for trafficking in drugs committed 'in the vicinity of a school' is not a strict liability offense; absent a plain indication of legislative intent to impose strict liability, the mental state of 'recklessness' applies.
Facts:
- Chad Lozier sold LSD from his former home.
- Lozier's home was located approximately 745 feet from the Holmes County Job and Family Services building.
- The third floor of that building housed 'Project Stay,' a remedial education program.
- There were no signs or markings on the building identifying it as a school to the public.
- Lozier did not know of the existence of the Project Stay school program within the building.
Procedural Posture:
- A grand jury indicted Lozier for trafficking in drugs with specifications that the sales occurred in the vicinity of a school.
- Lozier pled no contest to the charges in the trial court.
- The trial court convicted Lozier, ruling that the school vicinity specification was a strict liability offense regardless of his knowledge.
- Lozier appealed the conviction to the Fifth District Court of Appeals.
- The Fifth District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, holding that the required mental state was 'knowingly.'
- The Fifth District certified a conflict with a decision from the Ninth District Court of Appeals.
- The Supreme Court of Ohio granted jurisdiction to resolve the conflict.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does the sentencing enhancement statute for trafficking in LSD 'in the vicinity of a school' impose strict criminal liability regarding the offender's knowledge of the school's proximity?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Pfeifer
No, the statute does not impose strict liability regarding the vicinity of a school, but rather requires proof of recklessness. The Court reasoned that under Ohio's default statute for mens rea (R.C. 2901.21(B)), if a statute does not specify a mental state, 'recklessness' applies unless there is a plain indication of a purpose to impose strict liability. The Court compared the definition of 'vicinity of a school' with the definition of 'vicinity of a juvenile' in the same chapter. The legislature explicitly included language making mental state irrelevant for the 'vicinity of a juvenile' specification, but omitted that language for 'vicinity of a school.' This contrast indicates the legislature did not intend strict liability for the school specification. Therefore, the catchall mental state of recklessness applies.
Dissenting - Justice O'Connor
Yes, the statute imposes strict liability for trafficking in the vicinity of a school. The dissent argued that under the precedents of State v. Wac and State v. Maxwell, when a base offense contains a mental state (here, 'knowingly' trafficking) but the enhancement clause is silent, the omission implies an intent to impose strict liability for the enhancement. The dissent contended that the majority improperly looked to the definitions section rather than the offense section to determine intent. Furthermore, the dissent argued that the legislative purpose of protecting children from drug dealers supports a strict liability standard, similar to federal law.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the statutory interpretation of criminal intent in Ohio, specifically regarding sentence enhancements. It reinforces the presumption against strict liability in criminal law unless the legislature clearly expresses otherwise. By distinguishing between the 'vicinity of a juvenile' (strict liability due to immediate danger) and 'vicinity of a school' (recklessness due to theoretical danger), the Court established a nuanced approach to culpability based on the proximity of risk. This places a higher burden of proof on the state for school-zone enhancements where the school is not clearly identifiable.
