State v. Long

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
1995 Me. LEXIS 76, 656 A.2d 1228 (1995)
ELI5:

Rule of Law:

An out-of-court statement against interest, offered to exculpate a defendant, is not admissible under the hearsay exception in M.R.Evid. 804(b)(3) if the declarant is available to testify. Furthermore, a witness may not testify to a matter unless they have personal knowledge of it, meaning they perceived it with their own senses.


Facts:

  • David LaFlamme was subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury regarding charges against Brett Bodman, but LaFlamme refused.
  • LaFlamme then warned Bodman’s mother that the state might be looking for Bodman.
  • Following this, LaFlamme's trailer was vandalized with graffiti, including the words “nar[c]” and “rat”.
  • On September 24, 1992, LaFlamme's trailer was destroyed by fire.
  • Justin Long and his co-defendant, David Oakes, were heard discussing having hired someone else to set the fire, and mentioned the name “Frank”.
  • Frank Aehorn, an acquaintance of Long and Oakes, was later seen with singed hair, eyebrows, and wrists, as well as pink blotches on his hands.
  • Sometime after the fire, while both were incarcerated, Bodman allegedly admitted to LaFlamme that he was responsible for setting the fire.

Procedural Posture:

  • Justin Long was charged with arson and conspiracy to commit arson and was tried before a jury in the Superior Court (Knox County), a trial court.
  • During the trial, the court granted the State's objection and excluded testimony from the victim, David LaFlamme, regarding an alleged confession made by a third party, Brett Bodman.
  • The jury found Long guilty on both counts.
  • Long, as the appellant, appealed his convictions to the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, the state's highest appellate court, arguing the trial court's evidentiary ruling was improper.

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Issue:

Does the hearsay exception for a statement against interest under M.R.Evid. 804(b)(3) permit the admission of an out-of-court confession from a third party to exculpate the defendant when that third party is available to testify?


Opinions:

Majority - Clifford, Justice.

No. The hearsay exception for a statement against interest does not permit the admission of a third party's out-of-court confession when the declarant is available to testify. First, under M.R.Evid. 602, a witness may only testify to matters of which they have personal, sensory knowledge. LaFlamme's 'knowledge' that Bodman set the fire was derived entirely from Bodman's statement, not his own perception, and was therefore inadmissible. Second, Bodman's out-of-court statement is hearsay. For it to be admitted under the statement-against-interest exception (M.R.Evid. 804(b)(3)), the declarant must be unavailable. Because the defendant, Long, conceded that Bodman was available as a witness, the primary requirement for the exception was not met and the evidence was properly excluded.



Analysis:

This decision reinforces the strict foundational prerequisites for admitting evidence, particularly hearsay. It clarifies that the declarant's 'unavailability' is a mandatory threshold requirement for the statement-against-interest exception, not merely a factor to be considered. For defendants seeking to introduce exculpatory third-party confessions, this ruling underscores the necessity of either producing the confessing party as a live witness or providing definitive proof of their legal unavailability. The case serves as a clear illustration of the interplay between the personal knowledge rule (Rule 602) and the hearsay rule's exceptions (Rule 804).

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