State v. Lima
546 A.2d 770, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 87, 1988 WL 66799 (1988)
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Rule of Law:
Where a criminal statute defining an offense does not specify the requisite mental state (mens rea), the prosecution must prove, and the jury must be instructed, that the defendant acted at least purposely, knowingly, or recklessly. A conviction cannot be sustained based on an act devoid of criminal intent.
Facts:
- Fatima Lima, a native of Portugal with five years of schooling, worked as a babysitter for several children, including a two-and-a-half-year-old boy.
- On May 21, 1984, while in Lima's care, the boy sustained severe burns from scalding water in a bathtub.
- Lima initially called the boy's father and told him she had placed the boy in the tub to clean him without first testing the water's temperature.
- Later, Lima stated that the boy had climbed into the tub by himself, a version of events corroborated by her family members.
- The treating physician testified that the victim's burn patterns were inconsistent with an unassisted entry into the water and were more consistent with being placed buttocks-first into the tub.
- At the police station, Lima was given a rights form which she stated she did not understand "too good."
- After a detective reviewed the rights with her, Lima signed a waiver and gave a statement to the police.
Procedural Posture:
- The State of Rhode Island charged Fatima Lima with first-degree child abuse in a state trial court.
- Before trial, the court held a suppression hearing and ruled that a statement Lima made to police was voluntary and thus admissible as evidence.
- During the trial, the defense requested a jury instruction stating that a guilty verdict required finding the defendant intentionally burned the child; the trial justice refused this request.
- The trial justice also declined to instruct the jury that it had to independently determine if Lima's statement to police was voluntary before considering it as evidence.
- A jury found Lima guilty of first-degree child abuse.
- Lima (appellant) appealed her conviction to the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, arguing that the trial justice made several reversible errors.
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Issue:
Does a conviction for first-degree child abuse under a statute that is silent on the required mental state require the prosecution to prove that the defendant acted with criminal intent, and must the jury be instructed accordingly?
Opinions:
Majority - Murray, J.
Yes. A conviction for first-degree child abuse under a statute silent on the required mental state requires proof of criminal intent. The court held that the trial justice committed reversible error by refusing to instruct the jury that an intentional act was required for a conviction. As a general rule, when a statute does not define the requisite intent, it must be explicated in a jury instruction. Without such an instruction, the jury may have improperly convicted Lima simply for the act of placing the child in the water, without finding she possessed the necessary criminal intent. The court adopted the Model Penal Code standard, holding that on retrial, the jury must be instructed that to convict, it must find Lima acted purposely, knowingly, or recklessly. The court also found several other reversible errors, including the trial judge's failure to instruct the jury on its duty to determine the voluntariness of Lima's statement and the failure to give a curative instruction after the prosecutor misstated evidence in closing arguments.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the principle that criminal liability generally requires a culpable mental state (mens rea), even when a statute is silent on the matter. By adopting the Model Penal Code's standard of 'purposely, knowingly, or recklessly' for this child abuse statute, the court prevents it from becoming a strict liability offense, thereby protecting defendants from convictions for purely accidental or negligent acts. This case serves as a crucial precedent in Rhode Island for statutory interpretation, requiring courts to infer a mens rea element into criminal statutes that lack one. The opinion also reinforces procedural safeguards for defendants, highlighting the non-delegable duty of the jury to independently assess the voluntariness of a confession and the trial court's role in curing prejudicial statements by counsel.
