State v. Legendre
362 So. 2d 570 (1978)
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Rule of Law:
A stationary, common surface like a concrete parking lot, even if involved in an injury, does not constitute a "dangerous weapon" under Louisiana law, which defines such weapons as substances or instrumentalities used in a manner likely to produce death or great bodily harm.
Facts:
- Ronald D. Legendre was charged by the District Attorney of East Baton Rouge with the crime of battery with a dangerous weapon upon Michael White.
- Legendre filed a motion for a bill of particulars asking the State to identify the dangerous weapon he allegedly used.
- The State responded to the motion, identifying the alleged dangerous weapon as "Concrete on Parking Lot."
Procedural Posture:
- Ronald D. Legendre was charged by the District Attorney of East Baton Rouge with the crime of battery with a dangerous weapon.
- Legendre pled not guilty and filed a motion for a bill of particulars.
- The State responded to the bill of particulars, identifying the alleged dangerous weapon as "Concrete on Parking Lot."
- Legendre then filed a motion to quash the charge, arguing that a conviction based on "concrete on parking lot" as a dangerous weapon would not meet the requirements of aggravated battery.
- The trial court, believing that whether a dangerous weapon was involved was a question of fact for the jury, denied Legendre's motion to quash.
- Legendre, as the defendant-relator, applied for certiorari to the Supreme Court of Louisiana, which was granted.
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Issue:
Does a concrete parking lot, upon which a victim may fall and sustain injury, constitute a "dangerous weapon" for the purposes of an aggravated battery charge under Louisiana Revised Statute 14:34 and 14:2(3)?
Opinions:
Majority - Summers, Justice
No, a concrete parking lot does not constitute a "dangerous weapon" for the purposes of an aggravated battery charge. Justice Summers, writing for the majority, reasoned that Louisiana Revised Statute 14:2(3) defines "dangerous weapon" as including "any gas, liquid or other substance or instrumentality, which, in the manner used, is calculated or likely to produce death or great bodily harm." However, the court found that a concrete parking lot, a fixed and stationary surface, does not fit this definition. It is not an "instrumentality" in the sense of being an object that can be actively 'used' as a weapon, similar to how a graveled area or turf is not a weapon. While an accused could cause a victim to fall upon the concrete and sustain injuries, the court clarified that this action does not constitute 'use' of the concrete parking lot 'as a weapon.' The State's attempt to classify a parking lot as a dangerous weapon was deemed an improper extension of the statute, contrary to the fair import of its words (La.Rev.Stat. 14:3). Therefore, the indictment, as amended by the bill of particulars, failed to charge a valid offense.
Dissenting - Dennis, Justice
Yes, a concrete parking lot could constitute a "dangerous weapon" depending on the manner of its use, and the majority's interpretation unduly restricts the statutory definition. Justice Dennis, in his dissent, argued that the majority's opinion improperly narrows the meaning of "dangerous weapon" by excluding instrumentalities not commonly known as weapons. He contended that the legislative intent behind the statute was to define a dangerous weapon based on how an instrumentality was actually used, considering whether that use was calculated or likely to produce death or great bodily harm, rather than based on preconceived notions of customary usage. Therefore, he believed that the question of whether the concrete parking lot was used in a manner that met the statutory criteria should have been a factual determination for the jury.
Analysis:
This case significantly narrows the interpretation of "dangerous weapon" under Louisiana law, establishing that a fixed, unmovable surface cannot, by itself, be considered an "instrumentality" or an object "used" as a weapon. This ruling prevents prosecutors from elevating simple battery charges to aggravated battery solely based on the environment where an injury occurred, requiring a more direct and active 'use' of an object as a weapon. Future cases will likely distinguish between a passive involvement of an environment in an injury and the active employment of an object as a weapon by a perpetrator, ensuring a stricter application of aggravated battery statutes.
