State v. Lee
1984 N.J. LEXIS 2420, 475 A.2d 31, 96 N.J. 156 (1984)
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Rule of Law:
A conviction for possessing a weapon "under circumstances not manifestly appropriate for such lawful uses as it may have" under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5 d does not require the state to prove the defendant had an intent to use the weapon for an unlawful purpose.
Facts:
- James Whitney, an off-duty police officer, was in his home when he heard a noise on his screened-in porch.
- Whitney looked through a window and saw defendant Lee with his upper torso inside the screen of the porch.
- Whitney pursued Lee, but Lee escaped.
- Based on Whitney's description, police apprehended Lee a short time later.
- A search of Lee upon his arrest revealed a pair of scissors taped at the ends into a stiletto-like object, a spool of string, surgical tape, and black leather gloves.
- Whitney subsequently identified Lee as the intruder.
Procedural Posture:
- Defendant Lee was tried in a New Jersey trial court.
- A jury convicted Lee of burglary, possession of burglar’s tools, and unlawful possession of a weapon under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5 d.
- Lee appealed to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey.
- A two-judge majority of the Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.
- One judge on the Appellate Division panel dissented, arguing the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury that unlawful intent was an element of the crime.
- Based on the dissent, Lee appealed as of right to the Supreme Court of New Jersey, which also granted his petition for certification on the constitutional issues.
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Issue:
Does N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5 d, which criminalizes possessing a weapon 'under circumstances not manifestly appropriate for its lawful uses,' require proof of intent to use the weapon unlawfully to be constitutional?
Opinions:
Majority - Pollock, J.
No, the statute does not require proof of intent to use the weapon unlawfully to be constitutional. The Legislature created a distinct category of offense in N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5 d to address situations where someone possesses an object that can be used as a weapon under circumstances in which it is likely to be so used, even if an unlawful intent has not yet been formed. To read an unlawful intent requirement into this statute would render it superfluous, as another statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4 d, already criminalizes possession of a weapon with intent to use it unlawfully. The statute is not unconstitutionally overbroad as it does not impinge on any constitutionally protected conduct. Furthermore, it is not unconstitutionally vague because the phrase 'circumstances not manifestly appropriate' provides a person of ordinary intelligence with fair notice of the proscribed conduct and is sufficient to prevent arbitrary enforcement.
Dissenting - Clifford, J.
Yes, the statute is unconstitutionally vague as written and therefore requires an element of unlawful intent to be saved. The phrase 'not manifestly appropriate' is inherently subjective and lacks the precision required for a criminal statute, failing to provide clear notice of what conduct is forbidden. Without requiring proof of unlawful intent, the statute could be used to prosecute countless innocent scenarios where commonplace items like tools or kitchen knives are possessed in circumstances that are not, strictly speaking, 'manifestly appropriate' for their lawful use. The majority's holding disregards precedent that interpreted a similar prior statute to include an unlawful purpose requirement, and the jury should have been instructed that such intent was a necessary element for conviction.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies a crucial distinction in New Jersey weapons law, establishing that possession can be criminalized based on objective circumstances alone, without proving the defendant's subjective intent. By removing the mens rea requirement of 'unlawful purpose' from N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5 d, the court lowers the evidentiary burden for the prosecution in cases involving objects with both lawful and unlawful uses. This holding gives law enforcement and prosecutors a broader tool to address potentially dangerous situations before an explicit intent to harm is formed or can be proven. However, as the dissent argues, it creates a risk of over-criminalization and relies heavily on the discretion of police and juries to interpret the ambiguous 'not manifestly appropriate' standard.
