State v. Lastrapes
443 So.2d 652 (1983)
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Rule of Law:
In a prosecution for simple arson, the essential element that the damage was done without the owner's consent can be established by circumstantial evidence and does not require the direct testimony of the legal owner.
Facts:
- Jacqueline Lastrapes and her husband were the former owners of a house which was seized and sold at a sheriff's sale to two trusts.
- On October 19, 1981, at approximately 4:43 a.m., a police officer found Lastrapes in her car parked near the house.
- Lastrapes told the officer she was having car trouble, but then successfully started the car and drove away.
- Approximately one hour later, at 5:45 a.m., the police were called to a fire at the same house.
- Lastrapes was later questioned and admitted to police that she had gone to the house to reminisce, ignited a broom, and left it inside the house before leaving.
- Lastrapes denied having any intent to burn the house.
Procedural Posture:
- The State of Louisiana charged Jacqueline Lastrapes by bill of information with the crime of simple arson in a state trial court.
- The case was tried before a twelve-person jury.
- The jury found Lastrapes guilty as charged.
- The trial court sentenced Lastrapes to two years at hard labor.
- Lastrapes, as defendant-appellant, appealed her conviction and sentence to the Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
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Issue:
Is the testimony of a person closely associated with a property's owner, combined with circumstantial evidence, sufficient to prove the element of lack of consent in a simple arson case?
Opinions:
Majority - Guidry, J.
Yes, the testimony of a person closely associated with the owner, combined with circumstantial evidence, is sufficient to prove lack of consent. The court held that the element of lack of consent can be inferred from the circumstances. Citing State v. Perry, the court reasoned that malicious vandalism of property inherently suggests a lack of owner consent. Additionally, the testimony of Mrs. Charlotte Weinstein, who was in a position to know whether the trustees who owned the property had given permission, was sufficient to establish this element. The court concluded that direct testimony from the trustees themselves was not necessary, as the only reasonable inference from the evidence was that consent was not given.
Concurring - Domengeaux, J.
The author concurred without providing separate reasoning, instead referencing his concurring opinions in two other cases, State v. Goodman and State v. Vallare.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the principle that prosecutors can prove essential elements of a crime, such as lack of consent, through strong circumstantial evidence. It alleviates the burden of producing the legal owner of a property, who may be a corporation, a trust, or an otherwise unavailable individual, to testify to the obvious fact that they did not permit their property to be burned. The ruling provides prosecutors with greater flexibility in property crime cases by affirming that a jury can reasonably infer lack of consent from the malicious nature of the act itself, coupled with testimony from a knowledgeable party.
