State v. Lara
902 P.2d 1337, 183 Ariz. 233, 199 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 36 (1995)
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Rule of Law:
A criminal defendant's physical actions are considered a 'voluntary act' for the purposes of establishing criminal liability (actus reus) if they are performed consciously and as a result of effort and determination. Evidence of a personality disorder or mental impairment that increases a tendency toward rage does not render an act involuntary if the defendant was conscious and acting with effort.
Facts:
- After Miguel Lara had stalked and assaulted A1 Bartlett, Bartlett called the police because Lara was inside his house and refused to leave.
- Tucson police officer Kucsmas responded to the call, entered the house, and saw Lara lying on a couch.
- When Kucsmas asked Lara to stand up, Lara arose and pointed a knife at the officer.
- Kucsmas retreated down a corridor, drew his weapon, and ordered Lara to stop.
- Lara continued to advance on Kucsmas, shouting insults, slashing at him with the knife, and threatening to kill him.
- Lara pursued Kucsmas out of the house, eventually backing him into a fence.
- Lara then raised the knife and lunged at Officer Kucsmas, at which point Kucsmas shot him.
Procedural Posture:
- Miguel Lara was charged in a trial court with attempted murder and aggravated assault.
- At trial, the defense presented expert psychological testimony and requested jury instructions on 'voluntary act' and the lesser included offense of disorderly conduct.
- The trial court denied both requested instructions.
- A jury acquitted Lara of attempted murder but found him guilty of aggravated assault.
- Lara, as appellant, appealed his conviction to the Arizona Court of Appeals.
- The Court of Appeals, finding that Lara was entitled to both instructions, reversed the trial court's judgment.
- The State of Arizona, as petitioner, successfully petitioned the Supreme Court of Arizona for review.
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Issue:
Does evidence of a defendant's organic brain impairment and personality disorder, which may cause a 'reflexive' rage, negate the 'voluntary act' requirement for criminal liability under A.R.S. § 13-201, thereby entitling the defendant to a jury instruction on that issue?
Opinions:
Majority - Martone, Justice
No. Evidence of a personality disorder causing a tendency toward rage does not negate the requirement of a 'voluntary act' for criminal liability. A 'voluntary act' is statutorily defined as 'a bodily movement performed consciously and as a result of effort and determination.' The court reasoned that this requirement, the actus reus of a crime, is meant to exclude acts performed while unconscious, asleep, under hypnosis, or during a seizure—acts not driven by conscious effort. Lara's actions, while potentially influenced by a personality disorder, were performed consciously and demonstrated a relentless effort and determination to attack the officer. The expert testimony regarding his increased agitation and tendency for tantrums did not suggest he was unconscious or that his movements were akin to an autonomic reflex, and therefore he was not entitled to a voluntary act instruction.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the narrow legal definition of an 'involuntary act,' confining it to states like unconsciousness or seizure, rather than broader psychological impairments. It reinforces the critical distinction between actus reus (the physical act) and mens rea (the mental state), preventing defendants from using evidence of mental illness or personality disorders to argue that their physical movements were not voluntary. The ruling establishes that unless an act is truly a spasm or reflex disconnected from conscious determination, it satisfies the voluntary act requirement, pushing any arguments about mental state to the separate element of mens rea or the affirmative defense of insanity.
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