State v. Lachney
621 So.2d 846, 1993 WL 212810 (1993)
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Rule of Law:
The intentional act of one person spitting upon another constitutes criminal simple battery under Louisiana law, as it falls within the definition of the intentional use of force or violence upon the person of another.
Facts:
- Russell Lachney and Jeremy Matherne were enemies and had a history of altercations.
- On October 12, 1992, Lachney and Matherne encountered each other at the home of Dana Claimont.
- Lachney approached Matherne and asked him if he wanted to fight.
- Matherne replied, 'No,' to Lachney's offer to fight.
- Lachney then spit on Matherne.
- Lachney also threw a cigarette into Matherne's car and kicked the car's door.
Procedural Posture:
- Russell Lachney was charged by a bill of information on October 28, 1992, with simple battery (La.R.S. 14:35) and criminal damage less than $500 (La.R.S. 14:56).
- Lachney was arraigned on October 28, 1992, and pled not guilty.
- A bench trial was held on December 16, 1992, in the trial court (court of first instance).
- The trial court found Russell Lachney guilty on both counts and imposed a single sentence for both.
- Russell Lachney (defendant-appellant) appealed his conviction of simple battery to the Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fifth Circuit (intermediate appellate court).
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Issue:
Does the intentional act of one person spitting upon another constitute criminal simple battery under Louisiana law, specifically as 'the intentional use of force or violence upon the person of another'?
Opinions:
Majority - Judge Grisbaum
Yes, the intentional act of one person spitting upon another constitutes criminal simple battery under Louisiana law. The court affirmed the defendant's conviction for simple battery, rejecting his argument that spitting does not constitute 'the use of force or violence upon the person of another' or involve a 'noxious substance' as defined by La.R.S. 14:33 and 14:35. Acknowledging that the specific question was 'res nova' (a matter of first impression) in Louisiana jurisprudence, the court referenced LaFave & Scott's 'Handbook on Criminal Law,' which supports the view that 'offensive touchings' such as spitting into another's face 'will suffice for battery except in a few jurisdictions.' The court explicitly agreed with this interpretation, concluding that the intentional act of spitting on another 'constitutes criminal violence upon the victim.' While affirming the conviction, the court did note 'errors patent' in the sentencing, specifically the imposition of probation with a prison term for a single misdemeanor, a condition tied to a prior conviction, and an ambiguous sentence term, leading to a remand for resentencing.
Analysis:
This case is significant for clarifying and expanding the interpretation of 'force or violence' within Louisiana's simple battery statute. By explicitly including intentional spitting as a form of criminal violence, the court establishes a clear precedent that offensive, unwanted physical contact, even without direct physical injury, can meet the threshold for criminal battery. This ruling aligns Louisiana's criminal battery law with a broader common law understanding of battery, which often encompasses offensive touchings. It reinforces the principle that personal bodily integrity is protected from deliberate and disrespectful physical intrusions, thereby impacting future cases involving similar non-injurious, yet offensive, physical acts.
