State v. Kramer
1991 WL 31274, 809 S.W.2d 50, 1991 Mo. App. LEXIS 365 (1991)
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Rule of Law:
A defendant asserting a 'claim of right' defense must present evidence from which an honest belief in the right to appropriate property can be reasonably inferred, not merely subjective assertions, particularly when such belief is contradicted by professional standards or law. Furthermore, a temporary judicial substitution during trial, limited to ministerial duties or procedural matters and without a showing of actual prejudice, does not violate a defendant's due process rights.
Facts:
- Defendant, an attorney licensed in Louisiana and Illinois federal court, moved to Missouri and began working as a law clerk for a private attorney, Mr. Turner.
- Defendant represented himself as an attorney to Ms. Walker, the mother of one of Mr. Turner's criminal clients.
- Defendant told Ms. Walker that if she gave him $2,000, he would get her son out on bail, promising the son would be 'home for Thanksgiving.'
- Ms. Walker collected $2,000 in cash and gave it to the defendant, requesting a receipt.
- Mr. Turner's secretary, at defendant's request, typed a receipt for the bond money and informed Mr. Turner of the transaction.
- Mr. Turner testified that defendant was not assigned to Ms. Walker's son's case, had never given defendant permission to collect money for a bond, and when informed, asked defendant to place the money in the law firm’s escrow account, but defendant refused, stating the money had already been sent to California.
- Defendant testified he wired the money to a bail bondsman named Stephen Rice in California, who subsequently absconded with the funds, explaining he originally intended to use standard procedures but decided to use an out-of-state bondsman after discovering the son was a poor bond risk.
- A state official testified that neither defendant nor Stephen Rice were licensed bail bondsmen in Missouri, and out-of-state bail bonds were not legal in Missouri unless the individual was licensed in the state; a Western Union employee testified that the money order to California was sent five days before Ms. Walker gave money to the defendant.
Procedural Posture:
- Defendant was convicted by a jury of stealing by deceit.
- Defendant was sentenced as a prior offender to five years imprisonment.
- Defendant filed a Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief, which the trial court denied without an evidentiary hearing.
- Defendant appealed his conviction and the denial of his Rule 29.15 motion to the Missouri Court of Appeals, where the appeals were consolidated for review.
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Issue:
1. Does a defendant 'inject the issue of claim of right' to warrant a jury instruction if their only evidence of honest belief is a subjective assertion, which is contradicted by substantial evidence that their actions violated standard practices and state law? 2. Did the temporary substitution of an assignment judge for an ill trial judge, who then decided to recess the trial and excuse/replace a juror, deny the defendant due process and a fair trial when the original judge returned and found no prejudice?
Opinions:
Majority - REINHARD, Presiding Judge
No, the trial court did not err in refusing the claim of right instruction, nor did the temporary judicial substitution violate the defendant's due process rights. The court reasoned that to 'inject the issue of claim of right' and warrant a jury instruction under § 570.070, RSMo 1986, a defendant must 'adduce evidence of facts from which... the honesty of the defendant’s belief can be reasonably inferred.' Defendant's assertion that his employee position conferred the right to collect bond money was deemed a mere 'subjective conclusion,' insufficient to meet this standard, especially when contradicted by substantial evidence that his actions violated standard office practices and state law regulating bondsmen. Citing State v. Hontz, the court found it implausible given defendant's education and experience as a lawyer. Regarding judicial substitution, the court distinguished State v. Davis, where a substitute judge made significant rulings affecting the merits (e.g., motions to suppress, judgment of acquittal, instructions, sentencing), from the present case where the substitute judge primarily granted a recess and replaced a juror. The court characterized the substitute judge's actions as falling between performing a ministerial duty and making significant rulings on principal motions. Importantly, the court found 'not a shred of evidence pointing to any prejudice to defendant,' aligning with State v. Woods, which holds that relief requires a demonstration of prejudice. The original judge's subsequent denial of defendant's motions for mistrial and new trial implicitly affirmed a lack of prejudice.
Analysis:
This case establishes a stringent requirement for the 'claim of right' defense, demanding objective evidence of an honest belief rather than mere subjective assertions, a standard particularly reinforced when applied to individuals with professional legal training. It also clarifies the permissible scope of judicial substitution during trial, reinforcing that temporary replacements for procedural or ministerial actions do not automatically constitute reversible error unless the defendant can demonstrate actual, ascertainable prejudice. The ruling underscores the principle that procedural errors must be shown to be prejudicial to warrant appellate relief, thereby maintaining judicial efficiency while safeguarding fundamental fairness.
