State v. Komok
113 Wash.2d 810, 783 P.2d 1061, 1989 Wash. LEXIS 142 (1989)
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Rule of Law:
A legislature supersedes a common law element of a crime when it omits that element from the statutory definition of the offense. The deliberate removal of a common law term from a bill during the legislative process is strong evidence of the legislature's intent to abrogate the common law requirement.
Facts:
- Joseph A. Komok, age 16, and his 14-year-old sister entered a Lamonts department store without any money.
- A store security manager, Phil Wineinger, observed their actions.
- Komok picked up a baseball cap and handed it to his sister.
- While Komok stood facing her and looking around, his sister concealed the cap, a T-shirt, and leggings under the sweatshirt she was wearing.
- The sister then left the store without paying for the concealed items.
- After being stopped by the security manager, Komok stated that he and his sister 'had come in for school clothes and this was how they got them and just give them a break.'
Procedural Posture:
- The State charged Joseph A. Komok with third-degree theft in the Juvenile Department of the King County Superior Court, which served as the trial court.
- The trial court found Komok guilty of the charged offense.
- Komok, as appellant, appealed his conviction to the Washington Court of Appeals, Division One, with the State as appellee.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's conviction.
- Komok, as petitioner, was granted review by the Supreme Court of Washington.
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Issue:
Does Washington's theft statute, RCW 9A.56.020(1)(a), which requires an 'intent to deprive,' also include the common law element of 'intent to permanently deprive' the owner of property?
Opinions:
Majority - Smith, J.
No. The Washington theft statute does not retain the common law element of 'intent to permanently deprive.' The court reasoned that the legislature has the power to define crimes and supersede common law definitions. Here, the plain language of RCW 9A.56.020(1)(a) only requires an 'intent to deprive.' The court found dispositive evidence in the statute's legislative history: an early draft of the bill included the phrase 'intent permanently to deprive,' but the word 'permanently' was removed from the final enacted version. This deliberate omission demonstrates the legislature's clear intent to abrogate the common law requirement, making the prior appellate court decision in State v. Burnham, which held otherwise, no longer controlling.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the mens rea for theft in Washington, lowering the burden of proof for the prosecution. By explicitly rejecting the common law requirement of 'intent to permanently deprive,' the court settled a conflict in lower court rulings and solidified the principle of legislative supremacy in defining criminal offenses. This ruling makes it easier to prosecute acts like joyriding or temporary takings as theft, as the state no longer needs to prove the defendant intended to keep the property forever, only that they intended to deprive the owner of it.
