State v. Klapprott
127 N.J.L. 395, 1941 N.J. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 65, 22 A.2d 877 (1941)
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Rule of Law:
A statute that criminalizes speech that incites or advocates for hatred, abuse, violence, or hostility against a group based on race or religion is an unconstitutional violation of the freedom of speech because it is impermissibly vague and overbroad, failing to require that the prohibited speech create a clear and present danger of substantive evil.
Facts:
- August Klapprott, William Kohler, and Alton Clark were associated with the German-American Bund Auxiliary.
- In June 1940, Klapprott, Kohler, and Clark each made a speech at a meeting in Andover, Sussex County, New Jersey.
- The speeches were made in the presence of two or more persons.
- The speeches contained 'unworthy and scurrilous references to the Jewish people.'
- Klapprott and others, acting as trustees and agents, knowingly permitted the use of a structure for the purpose of holding this meeting where the speeches would occur.
Procedural Posture:
- Klapprott, Kohler, and Clark were charged in the trial court under three indictments for violating R.S. 2:157B-5 (the speech statute).
- Klapprott and others were charged in a fourth joint indictment for violating R.S. 2:157B-6 (the statute for permitting use of a building for such speech).
- The defendants withdrew their initial 'not guilty' pleas and filed a demurrer to each indictment, challenging the constitutionality of the statutes.
- The trial court overruled the demurrers, found the defendants guilty, and sentenced them to fines and imprisonment.
- The defendants (as plaintiffs in error) appealed the convictions to the New Jersey Supreme Court, which is the highest court of the state at the time.
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Issue:
Does a New Jersey statute criminalizing any speech that 'incites, counsels, promotes, or advocates hatred, abuse, violence or hostility against any group' based on race, religion, or color violate the free speech guarantees of the New Jersey and United States Constitutions?
Opinions:
Majority - Brogan, Chief Justice
Yes, the statute violates the state and federal constitutions. A law that penalizes speech based on its tendency to incite emotions like 'hatred' or 'hostility' is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The terms 'hatred,' 'abuse,' and 'hostility' are abstract, indefinite, and subjective, failing to provide a clear standard of what constitutes a criminal act. For speech to be punishable, it must create a 'clear and present danger' of bringing about substantive evils that the state has a right to prevent. This statute is not narrowly drawn to punish such specific conduct; instead, its sweeping scope could criminalize legitimate discussions in academic or private settings, thereby unconstitutionally restraining the freedom of speech guaranteed by both the New Jersey Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the high constitutional protection afforded to speech, even speech that is offensive and hateful. It establishes that for a hate speech statute to be valid, it cannot rely on vague and subjective terms like 'hatred' or 'hostility.' Instead, it must be narrowly tailored to punish speech that poses a 'clear and present danger' of imminent lawless action. This ruling invalidates a broad legislative attempt to regulate group defamation, setting a strong precedent in New Jersey for requiring a direct link between speech and tangible harm before constitutional protections can be curtailed. It highlights the judiciary's role in striking down laws that, while well-intentioned, could chill protected expression due to their vagueness.
