State v. Keller
592 So. 2d 1365, 1991 WL 310740 (1991)
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Rule of Law:
Under Louisiana's first-degree murder statute, a defendant can be charged with the killing of one human being if they possessed the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm on more than one 'person,' which includes an unborn fetus.
Facts:
- The state alleged that Gregory Keller killed Andrea Simmons.
- At the time of her death, Andrea Simmons was pregnant.
- The state also alleged that Keller's actions resulted in the death of Simmons' unborn child.
Procedural Posture:
- The State of Louisiana charged Gregory D. Keller by grand jury indictment with the first-degree murder of Andrea Simmons and her unborn child in a state trial court.
- Keller filed a motion to quash the indictment, arguing that a fetus is not a 'person' under the first-degree murder statute.
- The trial court denied Keller's motion to quash.
- Keller, the appellant, sought a supervisory writ from the Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit, which was initially denied.
- Keller then applied for a supervisory writ with the Louisiana Supreme Court.
- The Louisiana Supreme Court, the state's highest court, granted the writ and remanded the case to the Court of Appeal for briefing, argument, and a formal opinion.
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Issue:
Does the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm upon a pregnant woman and her unborn fetus satisfy the 'more than one person' element of Louisiana's first-degree murder statute, La.R.S. 14:30A(3), even though a fetus is not considered a 'human being' for the purpose of the homicide itself?
Opinions:
Majority - Lottinger, Judge
Yes, having the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm upon a pregnant woman and her unborn fetus satisfies the 'more than one person' element of the first-degree murder statute. The court distinguished between the elements of the crime. The act of homicide requires the killing of a 'human being,' which jurisprudence defines as a person born alive. Therefore, only Andrea Simmons could be the victim of the homicide. However, the intent element of La.R.S. 14:30A(3) requires a specific intent to kill or harm 'more than one person.' A separate statute, La.R.S. 14:2(7), explicitly defines 'person' to include 'a human being from the moment of fertilization and implantation.' Consequently, while a fetus cannot be the victim of a homicide, it is a 'person' for the purpose of establishing the specific intent required for a first-degree murder charge.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies a significant distinction within Louisiana's homicide laws, separating the legal definition of the victim for the act of killing (actus reus) from the definition of a person for the intent element (mens rea). By allowing a fetus to qualify as a 'person' for intent purposes, the court broadened the application of the first-degree murder statute in cases involving pregnant victims. This precedent allows prosecutors to elevate a murder charge from second-degree to first-degree based on the defendant's intent toward an unborn child, even if only one person born alive was killed.
