State v. Kalathakis
1990 WL 73072, 563 So.2d 228 (1990)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
For a defendant to be convicted of felony-manslaughter, their felonious conduct must be a legal cause of the death, meaning it was a substantial factor in bringing about the result. A defendant's conduct is not a substantial factor when a co-perpetrator is killed by police officers in response to the co-perpetrator's own intervening acts of fleeing and initiating a gunfight remote from the original crime scene.
Facts:
- Police suspected that Anita Kalathakis and Patrick Langley were manufacturing methamphetamine in their mobile home.
- On the night of February 8, 1987, fourteen police officers arrived at the mobile home to conduct a raid.
- As officers approached, a heavily armed man, Larry Calhoun, exited the rear of the trailer.
- Alerted to the police presence, Calhoun fled down the driveway.
- Three officers and two police dogs pursued Calhoun for approximately one-quarter of a mile away from the trailer.
- During the chase, Calhoun turned and shot one of the officers.
- The other officers returned fire, killing Calhoun.
- Meanwhile, other officers entered the trailer and found Kalathakis in a bedroom holding a pistol in a 'combat stance,' while Langley was in an attached bathroom pouring chemicals down a drain.
Procedural Posture:
- Anita Kalathakis was charged in trial court with attempted manufacturing of methamphetamine, manslaughter of Larry Calhoun, and attempted manslaughter.
- A jury found Kalathakis guilty on all charges.
- Kalathakis, as appellant, appealed her convictions to the Louisiana court of appeal.
- The court of appeal affirmed the convictions, holding that Calhoun's death was a foreseeable result of the drug manufacturing scheme.
- Kalathakis, as petitioner, sought a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court of Louisiana, which was granted to review the manslaughter conviction.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does the Louisiana felony-manslaughter statute hold a defendant criminally liable for the death of a co-perpetrator who is killed by police officers during a chase, a quarter-mile away from the scene of the underlying felony, after the co-perpetrator initiated a gunfight?
Opinions:
Majority - Lemmon, J.
No. The felony-manslaughter statute does not extend criminal liability to a defendant for the killing of a co-perpetrator by police under these circumstances. To establish guilt under the felony-manslaughter rule, the prosecution must prove that the defendant's conduct was a legal cause of the killing, not merely a 'but for' cause. Legal cause requires the defendant's act to be a 'substantial factor in bringing about the forbidden result.' In this case, Kalathakis's act of attempting to manufacture methamphetamine was not a substantial factor in Calhoun's death. The killing was not a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the drug manufacturing operation. Furthermore, Calhoun's own intervening acts of fleeing the scene and shooting at the pursuing officers broke the causal chain between Kalathakis's underlying felony and his death.
Concurring - Dennis, J.
No. I concur with the majority's reaffirmation of the rule from State v. Garner, which requires the actual killer in a felony-murder or felony-manslaughter case to be either the defendant or a co-perpetrator. My concurrence is primarily to express disagreement with a separate point made in a footnote regarding the defendant's attempted manslaughter conviction, which I believe raises due process concerns not addressed by the majority.
Concurring - Watson, J.
No. I concur because there is a total lack of legal causation between the defendant's unlawful activities and the death of Calhoun. Therefore, the manslaughter conviction must be reversed.
Analysis:
This decision significantly limits the scope of the felony-manslaughter doctrine in Louisiana by reinforcing the agency theory, which requires the killing to be committed by one of the felons. It rejects a broader proximate cause theory that would hold felons responsible for any foreseeable death resulting from the felony, including killings by police. The court solidifies the 'substantial factor' test for legal causation in this context, demanding a much stronger connection between the defendant's actions and the resulting homicide than simple 'but for' causation. This precedent makes it more difficult for prosecutors to secure felony-manslaughter convictions when the death is directly caused by a third party, such as a police officer or a victim, reacting to the felony.
