State v. Juluke
374 So. 2d 1259 (1979)
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Rule of Law:
When an offender's conduct is criminal under both a general criminal statute and a more specific criminal statute, the district attorney has the discretion to prosecute under either provision.
Facts:
- Edna Juluke presented a stolen credit card at a Sears, Roebuck, Inc. store to purchase merchandise.
- The credit card belonged to Mrs. Wardell Williams.
- To complete the transaction, Juluke signed the name 'Mrs. Wardell Williams' on the credit sales slip.
- The defendant's alleged forgery was for an instrument worth a small amount, noted in arguments as approximately $13.00.
Procedural Posture:
- The State of Louisiana charged Edna Juluke by bill of information with forgery, a felony, in the trial court.
- The defense filed a motion to quash the information, arguing that Juluke should have been charged with the misdemeanor offense of unauthorized use of a credit card.
- The trial court granted the defendant's motion to quash and dismissed the prosecution.
- The State of Louisiana (plaintiff-relator) applied for and was granted writs by the Supreme Court of Louisiana to review the trial court's ruling.
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Issue:
Does a district attorney have the discretion to charge a defendant with the general felony of forgery when the defendant's conduct also constitutes the more specific misdemeanor of unauthorized use of a credit card?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Calogero
Yes, a district attorney has the discretion to charge a defendant with the general crime of forgery even when the conduct also constitutes a more specific offense. Louisiana Revised Statute 14:4(1) explicitly grants prosecutors the discretion to proceed under either a general or a special criminal provision when a defendant's conduct violates both. In this case, Juluke's alleged act of signing another person's name on a sales slip with intent to defraud falls under the general forgery statute (R.S. 14:72). The same overall conduct of using a stolen credit card also falls under the specific unauthorized use of a credit card statute (R.S. 14:67.3). Because the conduct is criminal under both, the prosecutor's choice to charge forgery is permissible. The defendant's argument that the potential ten-year sentence for forgery is excessive is premature and can only be reviewed after a conviction and sentencing.
Analysis:
This case strongly affirms the principle of prosecutorial discretion in charging decisions. It clarifies that the existence of a specific statute, often carrying a lesser penalty, does not prevent prosecutors from charging under a broader, more general statute with a harsher penalty if the conduct fits both. This reinforces the significant power of the district attorney's office to select charges, impacting plea bargaining leverage and potential sentencing outcomes. The decision also illustrates judicial restraint by deferring constitutional challenges to sentencing until a concrete sentence is actually imposed, refusing to rule on a hypothetical punishment.
