State v. Jones
2003 WL 22092676, 855 So. 2d 408 (2003)
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Rule of Law:
The specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm required for an attempted second-degree murder conviction can be inferred from the circumstances of the case and the defendant's actions, such as deliberately driving a vehicle at a high rate of speed directly toward a person.
Facts:
- On August 1, 2000, Robert Glenn Jones and another man burglarized the home of Rocky Edwards.
- A neighbor saw the men leaving in a black truck and called 911.
- Deputy Andrew Green spotted the truck traveling at one hundred ten miles per hour and began a pursuit.
- Jones drove the truck down Robert Bihm Road, a dead-end street, and came to a stop near a large fence.
- Deputy Green parked his patrol vehicle on the road, exited with his weapon drawn, and ordered the truck's occupants to surrender.
- After a minute or two, Jones revved the truck's engine and began backing toward Deputy Green at a high rate of speed, approximately thirty-five to forty miles per hour.
- Jones steered the truck directly at Deputy Green, who had to jump onto the trunk of his own patrol car to avoid being struck.
- Jones's truck continued past the patrol car before flipping over while attempting a high-speed turn.
Procedural Posture:
- The State of Louisiana charged Robert Glenn Jones by bill of information with multiple offenses, including attempted first-degree murder of a peace officer.
- Jones pled guilty to simple burglary, conspiracy to commit simple burglary, and aggravated flight from an officer.
- A jury trial was held on the sole charge of attempted first-degree murder.
- The jury found Jones guilty of the lesser-included offense of attempted second-degree murder.
- The trial court sentenced Jones to forty years at hard labor for the attempted second-degree murder conviction, to run concurrently with his other sentences.
- Jones (Appellant) appealed his conviction for attempted second-degree murder to the Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the verdict. The State of Louisiana is the Appellee.
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Issue:
Does a defendant's act of reversing a vehicle at a high rate of speed directly toward a police officer, forcing the officer to take evasive action to avoid being hit, constitute sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to find the specific intent required for a conviction of attempted second-degree murder?
Opinions:
Majority - Saunders, J.
Yes. A defendant's act of reversing a vehicle at a high rate of speed directly toward a police officer provides sufficient evidence for a jury to infer the specific intent required for a conviction of attempted second-degree murder. The State must prove the defendant had the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm. This intent need not be proven as fact but may be inferred from the circumstances and the defendant's actions. Here, the evidence showed Jones looked back at Deputy Green, drove straight toward him while continually increasing his speed, and never veered away despite having room to maneuver through adjacent yards. Deputy Green's testimony that he had to jump onto his car to avoid being hit further supports the conclusion that Jones's actions were intended to cause death or great bodily harm, not merely to escape. This is consistent with precedents like State v. Taylor and State v. Percy, where using a vehicle in a dangerous manner against an officer was found to be sufficient evidence of specific intent.
Dissenting - Thibodeaux, J.
No. The evidence was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had the specific intent to kill. The defendant's actions demonstrated an intent to escape arrest, not an intent to commit murder. The majority's reliance on prior cases is misplaced, as the facts in those cases were 'far more egregious.' In this case, there was no contact between the vehicles, and the defendant's primary goal was clearly to flee from a dead-end street after a burglary. The fact that he could have turned around in a yard is inconsequential, as he still would have had to pass near the deputy to escape. The evidence supports a finding of intent to escape, not the specific intent to kill required for an attempted second-degree murder conviction.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the legal principle that specific intent, a critical element for many crimes including attempted murder, can be established entirely through circumstantial evidence. It affirms that a jury has wide latitude to infer a defendant's mental state from their physical actions. The case clarifies that using a vehicle as a weapon by aiming it directly at a person can elevate a charge from aggravated flight or assault to attempted murder. This precedent will likely be used by prosecutors in future cases involving vehicle pursuits where a suspect drives toward, rather than simply away from, law enforcement, making it easier to secure convictions for more serious offenses based on the driver's conduct.
