State v. Jones
855 So. 2d 408, 2003 WL 22092676 (2003)
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Rule of Law:
Specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, a required element for attempted second degree murder, may be inferred from the circumstances of the case and the defendant's actions, such as deliberately driving a vehicle at a high rate of speed directly toward a person.
Facts:
- On August 1, 2000, Robert Glenn Jones and an accomplice burglarized the home of Rocky Edwards.
- A neighbor saw the men and called 911, providing a description of their black truck.
- Deputy Andrew Green spotted the truck traveling at one hundred ten miles per hour and began a pursuit.
- Jones drove the truck down Robert Bihm Road, a dead-end street, and came to a stop near a fence.
- Deputy Green parked his patrol car, exited with his weapon drawn, and ordered the occupants of the truck to surrender.
- After about a minute, Jones revved the truck's engine and began backing up at a high rate of speed (35-40 mph and increasing) directly toward Deputy Green.
- Jones did not swerve, despite having room in adjacent yards to maneuver around the officer.
- To avoid being struck, Deputy Green was forced to jump onto the trunk of his patrol car as Jones's truck sped past, eventually flipping over.
Procedural Posture:
- Robert Glenn Jones was charged by bill of information in the 27th Judicial District Court with several offenses, including attempted first degree murder of a peace officer.
- Jones pled guilty to simple burglary of an inhabited dwelling, conspiracy to commit simple burglary, and aggravated flight from an officer.
- A jury trial was held on the charge of attempted first degree murder.
- The jury found Jones guilty of the lesser included offense of attempted second degree murder.
- The trial court sentenced Jones to forty years at hard labor for the attempted second degree murder conviction.
- Jones, as Defendant-Appellant, appealed his conviction for attempted second degree murder to the Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove his guilt.
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Issue:
Does a defendant's act of reversing a vehicle at a high and increasing rate of speed directly toward a police officer, forcing the officer to jump onto his own car to avoid being hit, constitute sufficient evidence for a rational jury to find the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm required for a conviction of attempted second degree murder?
Opinions:
Majority - Saunders, J.
Yes, a defendant's act of reversing a vehicle at high speed directly toward a police officer is sufficient evidence for a rational jury to find the specific intent required for attempted second degree murder. The court found that specific criminal intent can be inferred from the circumstances and the defendant's actions. In this case, Jones drove straight toward Deputy Green, continually increasing his speed, and never veered away despite available space in adjacent yards to do so. These actions, which forced the officer to jump onto his own car to avoid being hit, were sufficient for a jury, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, to infer that Jones had the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.
Dissenting - Thibodeaux, J.
No, the evidence was insufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed the specific intent to kill. The dissent argued that the defendant's actions demonstrated an intent to escape arrest, not an intent to murder. The defendant's truck never made contact with the officer or his vehicle, and his continued acceleration after passing the officer suggests flight was the primary motive. The fact that the defendant could have turned around is inconsequential because he still would have needed to pass near the officer to exit the dead-end street. Therefore, the evidence did not supply proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the specific intent to kill.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the legal principle that a vehicle can be considered a deadly weapon and its manner of use can serve as powerful circumstantial evidence of specific intent. The court affirms that even if a defendant's overarching motive is escape, specific actions taken during that escape—such as aiming a vehicle directly at an officer—can independently establish the requisite intent for attempted murder. This case provides a clear example for future courts in distinguishing between reckless endangerment during flight and a specific intent to kill, focusing on the deliberateness of the defendant's actions toward the victim.
