State v. Jones
2011 S.D. 60, 804 N.W.2d 409, 2011 SD 60 (2011)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
For a conviction of third-degree rape by intoxication under SDCL 22-22-1(4), the State must prove that the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the victim's intoxicated condition rendered her incapable of consenting. Legislative silence on a mens rea requirement in a statute defining a serious felony does not automatically create a strict liability offense.
Facts:
- On October 18, 2008, E.B. and her friend Abby began celebrating Abby's birthday by drinking at several bars, with E.B. consuming eight to ten beers and at least three shots of liquor.
- Around 1:00 a.m., the women met Abby's boyfriend, Chance, and his friend, Christopher Jones, and continued drinking before going to Chance's house.
- At the house, E.B. consumed another three or four beers while in a hot tub with Jones, Abby, and Chance.
- After Chance and Abby went to bed, E.B. had another drink while talking with Jones and Chance's roommate, Brent, who later testified that E.B. "didn’t seem wasted or drunk."
- Around 3:30 a.m., E.B. went to sleep on the living room couch.
- E.B. testified that she woke up twice to Jones sexually assaulting her, despite her physical and verbal resistance.
- Jones testified that E.B. invited him to share her blanket and that they engaged in consensual sexual intercourse.
- A hospital examination of E.B. the next day revealed the presence of Jones's sperm.
Procedural Posture:
- Christopher Jones was charged in a South Dakota circuit court, the trial court of first instance, with two counts of third-degree rape.
- During the jury trial, Jones requested a jury instruction requiring the State to prove he knew the victim, E.B., was too intoxicated to consent.
- The trial court refused Jones's proposed instruction, ruling that the defendant's subjective knowledge was not an element of the crime.
- The jury convicted Jones on both counts of third-degree rape.
- Jones appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court of South Dakota, arguing the trial court committed reversible error by failing to properly instruct the jury.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a conviction for third-degree rape under SDCL 22-22-1(4), which defines rape as sexual penetration with a person incapable of consenting due to intoxication, require the State to prove that the defendant knew or reasonably should have known of the victim's incapacitation?
Opinions:
Majority - Konenkamp, Justice
Yes. A conviction for third-degree rape under SDCL 22-22-1(4) requires the State to prove the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the victim's intoxicated condition rendered her incapable of consenting. The court reasoned that offenses without a mens rea (guilty mind) requirement are generally disfavored in Anglo-American jurisprudence, especially for serious felonies with severe punishments. Legislative silence on a knowledge element does not automatically create a strict liability crime. To interpret the statute as strict liability would lead to an 'absurd or unreasonable result,' potentially criminalizing conduct that a defendant reasonably believed was consensual and making South Dakota an outlier among jurisdictions. The difficulty in assessing the line between intoxication and incapacitation further supports the need for a knowledge element to avoid punishing 'apparently innocent conduct.'
Dissenting - Gilbertson, Chief Justice
No. A conviction under SDCL 22-22-1(4) does not require proof of the defendant's knowledge of the victim's incapacitation. The statute's language is clear and unambiguous, and a court is not at liberty to add provisions the Legislature did not incorporate. The Legislature's 1985 amendment, which removed the requirement that the accused administer the intoxicant, demonstrates an intent to change, not retain, any implied knowledge element. Furthermore, the court has previously interpreted other subsections of the same rape statute (concerning age and mental incapacity) as strict liability offenses, and the Legislature's subsequent failure to amend the statute to add a knowledge requirement indicates acquiescence to that interpretation. It is a legitimate legislative policy choice to prioritize the protection of victims incapable of consent, and this interpretation is neither absurd nor unreasonable.
Dissenting - Zinter, Justice
No. A conviction under SDCL 22-22-1(4) does not require a showing of the defendant's knowledge. This dissent concurs with Chief Justice Gilbertson's reasoning, adding that the majority's decision creates an inconsistency by requiring mens rea for intoxication-based incapacity but not for incapacity due to mental disability under a parallel subsection. The dissent argues that the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized sex offenses as an exception to the general rule disfavoring strict liability. Finally, the Legislature's choice not to include an explicit knowledge requirement, unlike other states cited by the majority, reflects a deliberate policy decision that the court should respect. The defendant's state of mind is not completely disregarded, as his perceptions are relevant to the objective determination of whether the victim was truly incapacitated.
Analysis:
This case establishes a significant precedent in South Dakota criminal law by judicially inserting a mens rea requirement into a rape statute that was silent on the issue. The decision highlights the tension between judicial restraint and the impulse to prevent what a court may view as unjust outcomes under a strict liability framework for a serious felony. By aligning with the majority of jurisdictions, the court prioritizes the principle that severe criminal sanctions should require a culpable mental state. The ruling will require prosecutors in future rape-by-intoxication cases to prove not just the victim's condition, but also the defendant's awareness of that condition, raising the burden of proof for the State.
