State v. Jones
416 A.2d 676, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1660 (1980)
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Rule of Law:
When a defendant raises an entrapment defense, the prosecution may not attempt to prove the defendant's predisposition to commit the crime by cross-examining them about a prior indictment that did not result in a conviction or by posing speculative, hypothetical questions about other potential crimes.
Facts:
- Lonnie Wilkerson, a government informer, approached defendant Jones in a bar two weeks before the alleged crime.
- Wilkerson, whom Jones described as a large and forceful man he feared, persistently asked Jones three or four times to deliver heroin to his girlfriend.
- On March 7, 1976, at Wilkerson's home, Wilkerson facilitated a phone call between Jones and a woman named Patricia, during which Jones reluctantly agreed to sell heroin to her the next day.
- On March 8, 1976, Wilkerson gave Jones a Band-Aid box containing packets of heroin, instructing him to sell the contents for $1,200.
- Jones met Wilkerson and Patricia (who was an undercover agent) in a parking lot, where he sold one packet of heroin to Patricia for $200.
- After the sale, Jones returned to Wilkerson's house, gave Wilkerson the remaining heroin and the $200 from the sale.
- Wilkerson then placed a $50 bill into Jones's shirt pocket without conversation.
Procedural Posture:
- The defendant, Jones, was charged in Superior Court with unlawful possession with intent to deliver and unlawful delivery of heroin.
- At a jury trial, Jones did not contest the acts but raised the affirmative defense of entrapment.
- The prosecutor, during cross-examination, questioned Jones about a prior, unrelated indictment for a cocaine offense and posed a series of hypothetical questions about other crimes he might commit.
- The jury returned guilty verdicts on both counts.
- The defendant appealed the judgment of conviction to the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, alleging that the prosecutor's cross-examination was improper and prejudicial.
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Issue:
Does a prosecutor's cross-examination of a defendant claiming entrapment, which uses a prior indictment (not a conviction) and speculative hypothetical questions about other potential crimes, constitute reversible error by introducing impermissibly prejudicial evidence to prove predisposition?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Justice Bevilacqua
Yes. A prosecutor's cross-examination of a defendant using a prior indictment and speculative hypotheticals constitutes reversible error because such evidence is not reliable or probative of predisposition and is impermissibly prejudicial. When an entrapment defense is raised, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime. The inquiry into predisposition must be 'appropriate and searching,' using reliable evidence with a direct bearing on the defendant's state of mind at the time of the inducement. Evidence of a prior indictment is 'rank hearsay' that is probative of nothing more than 'official suspicion' and has great potential to inflame the jury. Similarly, hypothetical questions about whether the defendant would commit other, dissimilar crimes under duress are based on a speculative factual basis, have little relevance to the issue of predisposition for the specific crime charged, and serve only to becloud the issue and inject prejudice. This method of inquiry is especially pernicious as it leaves the defendant unable to rebut the vague accusations with anything more than a 'bald denial.' The trial justice abused his discretion by allowing this line of questioning, which went beyond the bounds of permissible cross-examination and requires reversal of the conviction.
Analysis:
This decision establishes a crucial boundary on the scope of prosecutorial inquiry when rebutting an entrapment defense in Rhode Island. It clarifies that the 'appropriate and searching inquiry' into a defendant's predisposition is not a license to introduce any evidence of bad character. By barring the use of mere indictments and speculative hypotheticals, the court protects defendants from having their case decided on prejudice rather than on competent, relevant evidence. This ruling forces the state to prove predisposition through more reliable means, such as evidence of prior similar acts, reputation, or direct testimony, thereby reinforcing the principle that a defendant should be tried for the crime charged, not for unproven accusations or imagined misconduct.
