State v. Jones
434 N.W.2d 380, 147 Wis. 2d 806, 1989 Wisc. LEXIS 7 (1989)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on the privilege of defense of others if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, could support a finding that the defendant reasonably believed their actions were necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to a third person.
Facts:
- Donald Price, who had a history of violently beating his partner Eunice Jones (the defendant's sister), was known to be violent when intoxicated.
- On April 25, 1985, Price, who was significantly drunk with a blood alcohol content of .316, was arguing with and physically assaulting Eunice outside the Jones family home.
- When the defendant's mother intervened, Price pushed her and threatened to kill her.
- The defendant, 17-year-old Patrick Jones, intervened to protect his mother and was pushed down several steps and then punched by the larger, 38-year-old Price.
- Price continued to hold Eunice, twisting her arm and hitting her in the face.
- Fearing for his sister's life, Jones ran into the house, retrieved a butcher knife, and returned outside.
- Jones swung the knife at Price but missed. Price continued to hold Eunice.
- Shortly thereafter, Eunice broke free from Price's grasp. Price immediately turned his aggression toward Jones, swung at him, and was fatally stabbed as he moved onto the knife Jones was holding.
Procedural Posture:
- The state charged Patrick Jones with first-degree murder in the circuit court for Racine county, a trial court.
- At trial, the defendant requested a jury instruction on the 'defense of others' privilege, which the circuit court judge denied.
- The jury convicted Jones of the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder.
- Jones (appellant) appealed his conviction to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, an intermediate appellate court.
- The court of appeals reversed the conviction, ruling that the circuit court erred by refusing the instruction, and remanded the case for a new trial.
- The State of Wisconsin (petitioner) sought review of the court of appeals' decision in the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, the state's highest court.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a trial court commit reversible error by refusing to instruct the jury on the 'defense of others' privilege when there is conflicting evidence as to whether the person being defended was still in imminent danger at the moment the defendant used deadly force?
Opinions:
Majority - Shirley S. Abrahamson, J.
Yes. A trial court commits reversible error by refusing to instruct the jury on the 'defense of others' privilege if any reasonable construction of the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the accused, could support the defendant's theory. The reasonableness of the defendant's belief that his intervention was necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm is a question for the jury, not the court. Here, despite conflicting testimony about the time elapsed between Eunice's escape and the stabbing, a jury could reasonably conclude that the events were part of one continuous, rapid assault. Given Price's known violence, his intoxication, and his immediate turn of aggression toward the defendant after Eunice broke free, a jury could find that the defendant reasonably believed his sister was still in imminent danger. Therefore, the defendant was entitled to have the jury consider his defense of others claim.
Dissenting - Callow, J.
No. The trial court properly refused to give the instruction because the 'defense of others' privilege requires the threat to the third person to be imminent. The defendant's own testimony established that his sister, Eunice, was 'gone' and had been for 'one or two minutes' before the stabbing occurred. This departure created a critical break in the action that eliminated any imminent threat to Eunice. Citing precedent from Thomas v. State, the dissent argues that once the person being defended is out of the assailant's presence, the privilege to use deadly force on their behalf ceases. The majority's holding effectively removes the imminence requirement from the statute.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the principle that the determination of the reasonableness of a defendant's belief in the context of self-defense or defense of others is fundamentally a question of fact for the jury. It lowers the bar for a defendant to receive a requested jury instruction on an affirmative defense, mandating it whenever there is any evidence, viewed favorably to the defendant, to support the claim. The case highlights that in fast-moving, violent encounters, a jury can consider the entire incident as a single, continuous transaction, and that a momentary escape by the victim does not automatically, as a matter of law, terminate the privilege to defend them.
