State v. Johnson
227 P.3d 918, 2010 Ida. LEXIS 21, 148 Idaho 664 (2010)
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Rule of Law:
Evidence of prior uncharged sexual misconduct is inadmissible under Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) to prove a defendant's criminal propensity, even in child sex-abuse cases, unless it demonstrates a common scheme or plan linked by highly specific characteristics that objectively establish the same person committed all acts, going beyond mere general similarities.
Facts:
- David Leon Johnson lived in Paul, Idaho, with his wife, Michelle Johnson, and their five children.
- When David Leon Johnson was between fifteen and sixteen years old, he had molested his younger sister, Elizabeth (approximately eight years old), which included exposing himself to her, requesting she expose herself, and asking her to touch his penis.
- In Spring Break 2004, Michelle Johnson left their daughter, A.J., who was between six and seven years old, alone with David Leon Johnson while Michelle visited her parents in Utah with their other children.
- A.J. testified that during that time, David Leon Johnson molested her on two occasions, involving touching and penetrating her genitalia, making her touch his penis until he ejaculated, and forcing her to lick chocolate off his penis, and attempting penetration in the shower.
- When Michelle Johnson confronted David Leon Johnson about A.J.'s report in 2004, he claimed A.J. had walked in on him masturbating while watching pornography and was simply confused.
- Michelle Johnson did not report her suspicions of abuse to the police until over a year later, in June 2005, shortly before a custody hearing in her pending divorce from David Leon Johnson.
Procedural Posture:
- David Leon Johnson was charged in district court with three counts of lewd and lascivious conduct with a minor under sixteen.
- During the trial, the district court admitted, over the defense's objection, evidence that Mr. Johnson had molested his younger sister when he was a teenager.
- The district court also admitted, over objection, Michelle Johnson's testimony that Mr. Johnson claimed A.J. had walked in on him masturbating while watching pornography and was confused.
- The jury acquitted Mr. Johnson of the third charge, but convicted him of the first two counts of lewd conduct.
- The district court sentenced Mr. Johnson to two concurrent terms of twenty years with five years fixed.
- Mr. Johnson (Defendant/Appellant) appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho, challenging the admission of his prior misconduct evidence and his statements regarding masturbation/pornography, and the exclusion of other evidence.
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Issue:
Did the district court err under I.R.E. 404(b) by admitting evidence of David Leon Johnson’s prior sexual misconduct with his sister as proof of a common scheme or plan, and if so, was the error harmless?
Opinions:
Majority - W. Jones, Justice
Yes, the district court erred under I.R.E. 404(b) by admitting evidence of Johnson’s prior sexual misconduct with his sister, and that error was not harmless. Under I.R.E. 404(b), evidence of other crimes or acts is inadmissible to show a defendant's criminal propensity but may be admissible for other specific purposes such as a common scheme or plan. The Court clarified that its prior rulings in State v. Moore and State v. Tolman had been erroneously interpreted by lower courts as creating a 'lax analysis' or special exception for child sex-abuse cases, allowing prior bad acts for mere 'credibility and corroboration.' This Court, in State v. Grist, repudiated that notion, affirming that no different rule applies to 404(b) evidence in child sex-abuse cases; the theoretical underpinning of 'corroboration' in such cases is indistinguishable from propensity evidence. To be admissible under 404(b) as a 'common scheme or plan,' the prior acts must be linked by common characteristics that objectively go beyond merely showing a criminal propensity and instead tend to establish that the same person committed all the acts. The similarities identified by the trial court in this case—both victims were young juvenile females, Johnson was an authority figure, and both involved requesting the victim to touch his penis—were found to be 'unremarkable' and 'too attenuated' to demonstrate a common scheme or plan. Admitting such generalized similarities essentially allows inadmissible propensity evidence. Furthermore, the erroneous admission of this evidence was not harmless. Given that the State presented no physical evidence, and the conviction hinged almost entirely on the victim's testimony, the highly prejudicial nature of evidence regarding prior sexual misconduct with young children likely contributed to Johnson's conviction. While a limiting instruction was given, it was insufficient to cure the prejudice. The Court rejected the State's argument that the jury's acquittal on one charge indicated harmlessness, as there was no victim testimony for that particular charge. However, the district court did not err in admitting evidence that Johnson told his wife that A.J. had walked in on him masturbating while watching pornography. This evidence was relevant under I.R.E. 401, not as 404(b) propensity evidence, but to corroborate Mrs. Johnson’s credibility by explaining her delay in reporting the alleged abuse, and as an admission by Johnson suggesting some form of sexual encounter occurred. Under I.R.E. 403, the probative value of this unusual explanation was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
Concurring - Chief Justice Eismann (and Justices Burdick, J. Jones, Horton)
We concur with the majority opinion, agreeing that the conviction should be vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings based on the erroneous admission of evidence under I.R.E. 404(b).
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the application of Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) in child sex-abuse prosecutions, explicitly repudiating any 'special rule' or relaxed standard that previously allowed prior bad acts evidence for mere 'corroboration' or general 'credibility.' By reaffirming that evidence of prior misconduct must demonstrate a highly specific and objective 'common scheme or plan' beyond generalized similarities, the Supreme Court strengthens protections against the admission of prejudicial propensity evidence. This ruling reinforces the principle that defendants should be tried for the crime charged, not for their character, and imposes a stricter burden on the prosecution to show true relevance under Rule 404(b) to avoid unfair prejudice.
