State v. Johnson
1997 WL 471969, 698 So.2d 1051 (1997)
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Rule of Law:
Under Louisiana's second-degree murder statute, the doctrine of transferred intent is valid. A defendant's specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm on an intended victim can be legally transferred to an unintended victim who is actually killed, thereby satisfying the intent element for a second-degree murder charge.
Facts:
- Harold Johnson's brother, James, was severely beaten by men he identified as members of the 'White Street Gang,' including David Davis.
- Seeking revenge, Harold Johnson traveled from California to Louisiana, visited his brother in the hospital, and learned the names of the alleged attackers.
- On November 2, 1990, Johnson, armed with a .22 pistol, and several friends armed with bats went to the Blue Light Cafe to confront the men who beat his brother.
- Inside the club, Johnson provoked a confrontation with David Davis.
- Johnson fired several shots at Davis, claiming it was in self-defense after Davis allegedly drew a weapon, a claim disputed by Davis and other witnesses.
- The shots missed Davis but struck and killed another bar patron, Inez Smith.
- Johnson fled Louisiana but was later apprehended by police in New Mexico.
Procedural Posture:
- Harold Lee Johnson was indicted for the second-degree murder of Inez Smith.
- Following a trial in January 1992, a jury found Johnson guilty as charged.
- The District Court sentenced him to life in prison at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
- Trial counsel filed a motion for appeal, but the appeal was dismissed after procedural delays were missed.
- Johnson successfully sought post-conviction relief and was granted an out-of-time appeal to the Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
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Issue:
Does the doctrine of transferred intent apply to Louisiana's second-degree murder statute, allowing a defendant's specific intent to kill one person to be transferred to an unintended victim who is actually killed?
Opinions:
Majority - Norris, J.
Yes. The doctrine of transferred intent applies to the second-degree murder statute. The statute requires the State to prove only that the offender had a specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm upon a human being, not that the offender intended to kill the specific person who died. The court reasoned that a plain reading of the statute, R.S. 14:30.1, does not require a connection between the subject of the defendant's intent and the actual victim. This interpretation is supported by long-standing Louisiana jurisprudence, including State v. Salter (1895) and State v. Thomas (1910), which established and affirmed the doctrine. The court rejected Johnson's argument that the later creation of a negligent homicide statute negated the purpose of transferred intent, noting the legislature has never acted to overrule this precedent. To rule otherwise would, in the court's view, 'essentially reward the defendant for his poor marksmanship—an unacceptable result.'
Analysis:
This decision reaffirms the continued viability of the common law doctrine of transferred intent within the modern Louisiana Criminal Code. It clarifies that the mens rea for second-degree murder attaches to the act of killing a human being, regardless of whether the actual victim was the intended one. The ruling prevents defendants from escaping a murder conviction by claiming they were a bad shot and killed a bystander by mistake. This precedent solidifies the principle that a defendant's culpability is determined by their criminal intent, not by the accidental outcome of their intentional act, thus preventing the charge from being reduced to a lesser offense like negligent homicide.
