State v. Johns
1984 Mo. LEXIS 298, 679 S.W.2d 253 (1984)
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Rule of Law:
An accomplice may be convicted of capital murder if the jury finds they acted with the purpose of promoting or furthering the commission of the capital murder, as this finding sufficiently attributes the necessary mental state for the offense. Additionally, a co-inhabitant with common authority over a premises may consent to a warrantless search, and that consent cannot be revoked after incriminating evidence has been discovered in plain view.
Facts:
- In the weeks preceding February 18, 1982, Johns discussed a plan to rob an Onyx gas station with Linda Klund and David Smith.
- During one conversation, Johns told Smith that he 'never left any witnesses.'
- On February 18, 1982, Johns purchased fifteen .32 caliber shells.
- Linda Klund drove Johns, who was carrying a handgun, and Robert Shawn Wishon to the gas station.
- While Klund waited, Johns and Wishon entered the station; shortly thereafter, the seventeen-year-old attendant, Donald Voepel, Jr., was found dead from three close-range bullet wounds to the back of his head.
- After the robbery, Johns gave Klund $50 and a bag containing the gun and bullets, instructing her to hide it.
- Later that night, Johns went to the home of Albert Keener and confessed that he and Wishon had robbed the station and that he had shot the attendant in the head three times.
Procedural Posture:
- Johns was tried for capital murder in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis.
- A jury found Johns guilty of capital murder.
- During the penalty phase, the jury found statutory aggravating circumstances and recommended a sentence of death.
- The trial court formally imposed the death sentence.
- Johns's motion for a new trial was overruled by the trial court.
- Johns appealed his conviction and sentence directly to the Supreme Court of Missouri.
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Issue:
Does a jury instruction for capital murder based on accomplice liability, which allows a conviction if the defendant acted 'with the purpose of promoting or furthering the commission of capital murder,' improperly permit a conviction without a specific finding that the defendant personally possessed the required mental state of deliberation?
Opinions:
Majority - Welliver, J.
No. A jury instruction for capital murder based on accomplice liability is proper because requiring the jury to find that the defendant purposely aided in the capital murder sufficiently establishes the necessary intent for the crime. The court, relying on its precedent in State v. White, held that an accomplice who is found to have 'purposely aided in capital murder' has the same intent as the active participant and is liable to the same degree. The instruction's requirement that the jury find Johns acted 'with the purpose of promoting or furthering the commission of capital murder' correctly submitted the necessary elements for accomplice liability, making a separate finding of personal deliberation by the accomplice unnecessary. The court also upheld the warrantless search of Johns's bedroom, ruling his mother had 'common authority' over the shared apartment and could give valid consent. Her attempt to revoke consent after an officer saw incriminating notes in plain view was deemed ineffective.
Analysis:
This decision reaffirms and solidifies Missouri's approach to accomplice liability in capital murder cases, following the precedent set in State v. White. It establishes that an accomplice's intent for capital murder is satisfied by proof that they purposely aided the commission of the capital murder, thereby equating their mental state with that of the principal actor. This lowers the prosecution's burden, as it does not need to prove the accomplice personally deliberated. The ruling on the search and seizure issue is also significant, providing a clear application of the 'common authority' doctrine from United States v. Matlock to family living situations and establishing that consent cannot be withdrawn post-discovery of incriminating evidence, which limits a defendant's ability to thwart a search once it becomes fruitful.
