State v. Jeremiah Green
205 P.3d 798, 350 Mont 141, 2009 MT 114 (2009)
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Rule of Law:
Evidence of a defendant's prior threat to kill a specific individual may be admissible in a subsequent homicide trial for that individual, even if made several years prior, because the high degree of similarity between the threat and the crime can outweigh concerns about remoteness in time under Rule 404(b).
Facts:
- In 2001, Jeremiah Green told his roommate, Michael Pierce, that he would kill Gerald Sirucek someday if he had the chance.
- Several weeks before the 2005 homicides, Green stole a .22 caliber pistol from his cousin.
- Approximately two weeks before the shootings, Green allegedly told Troy McDonald that Sirucek had money and he wanted McDonald's help in robbing him.
- On February 2, 2005, Green, Sirucek, Catherine Madplume, McDonald, and Gerald Gardipee spent the day drinking together.
- According to McDonald, he and Green formed a plan for McDonald to kill Sirucek and Green to kill Madplume.
- In the early morning of February 3, 2005, McDonald used Green’s pistol to shoot and kill Sirucek, who was passed out in Green's jeep.
- McDonald testified that Green then stabbed Sirucek in the throat to ensure he was dead and took his wallet.
- Shortly thereafter, McDonald lured Madplume into a trailer and shot and killed her.
Procedural Posture:
- The State of Montana charged Jeremiah C. Green in the Twentieth Judicial District Court, Lake County, with two counts of deliberate homicide by accountability and one count of tampering with evidence.
- Accomplices Troy McDonald and Gerald Gardipee entered plea agreements with the State, agreeing to testify against Green at trial.
- The District Court overruled Green's pre-trial objection to the admission of testimony from Michael Pierce regarding Green's four-year-old threat against victim Gerald Sirucek.
- Following a four-day trial, a jury found Green guilty on all counts.
- The District Court sentenced Green to two consecutive life sentences and a consecutive ten-year term, with no opportunity for parole.
- Green (Appellant) appealed his judgment and commitment to the Supreme Court of Montana, with the State as Appellee.
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Issue:
Did the District Court err by admitting evidence of Green’s prior statement that he would like to kill the victim, made four years before the homicides?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Rice
No, the District Court did not err by admitting the evidence. A defendant's prior threat to carry out the very crime against the identical victim is highly probative evidence of intent that is not automatically rendered inadmissible by the passage of time. The court rejected a bright-line rule for remoteness, holding that the specific and connected nature of the four-year-old threat to kill Sirucek and the eventual killing of Sirucek made the evidence too similar to be excluded. The court concluded that the statement's probative value in proving intent and plan was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
Dissenting - Justice Nelson
The dissenting opinion does not address the admissibility of Green's prior statement. It would reverse and remand for a new trial based on a different issue: ineffective assistance of counsel. The dissent argues that there was 'no plausible justification' for defense counsel’s failure to request a mandatory jury instruction that accomplice testimony ought to be viewed with distrust. Because the State's case relied heavily on the testimony of accomplice Troy McDonald, this failure was a deficient and prejudicial error that deprived Green of a fair trial, and the claim was clear enough from the record to be decided on direct appeal.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the 'remoteness' factor for admitting prior bad acts evidence under Rule 404(b), reinforcing that there is no arbitrary time limit for admissibility. The holding emphasizes that the similarity and direct connection between the prior act and the charged crime are paramount, allowing a highly specific, older threat to be admitted if it is directly relevant to proving intent for the crime committed. This provides prosecutors greater latitude in using such evidence and signals to defense attorneys that an objection based solely on the passage of time is unlikely to succeed if the prior act is a 'threat to carry out the very crime against the identical victim.'
